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VISUAL RULEMAKING
ELIZABETH G. PORTER† & KATHRYN A. WATTS‡
Federal rulemaking has traditionally been understood as a text-bound, technocratic
process. However, as this Article is the first to uncover, rulemaking stakeholders—
including agencies, the President, and members of the public—are now deploying
politically tinged visuals to push their agendas at every stage of high-stakes, often
virulently controversial, rulemakings. Rarely do these visual contributions appear
in the official rulemaking record, which remains defined by dense text, lengthy cost-
benefit analyses, and expert reports. Perhaps as a result, scholars have overlooked
the phenomenon we identify here: the emergence of a visual rulemaking universe
that is splashing images, GIFs, and videos across social media channels. While this
new universe, which we call “visual rulemaking,” might appear to be wholly dis-
tinct from the textual rulemaking universe on which administrative law has long
focused, the two are not in fact separate. Visual politics are seeping into the
technocracy.
This Article argues that visual rulemaking is a good thing. It furthers fundamental
regulatory values, including transparency and political accountability. It may also
facilitate participation by more diverse stakeholders—not merely regulatory
insiders who are well-equipped to navigate dense text. Yet we recognize that visual
rulemaking poses risks. Visual appeals may undermine the expert-driven founda-
tion of the regulatory state, and some uses may threaten or outright violate key legal
doctrines, including the Administrative Procedure Act and longstanding prohibi-
tions on agency lobbying and propaganda. Nonetheless, we conclude that adminis-
trative law theory and doctrine ultimately can and should welcome this robust new
visual rulemaking culture.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, late-night cable pundit John Oliver used his popular
HBO show to illustrate the importance of federal regulation.1 He ran
a 13-minute segment—in truth, a rant—opposing the approach of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to so-called “net neu-
trality.”2 After excerpting a video that depicted a monotone FCC
1 LastWeekTonight, Net Neutrality: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO),
YOUTUBE (June 1, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU [hereinafter
John Oliver: Net Neutrality].
2 See The Open Internet, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/
guides/open-internet (last visited June 28, 2016) (explaining that net neutrality, or an Open
Internet, means that “[b]roadband service providers cannot block or deliberately slow
speeds for internet services or apps, create special ‘fast lanes’ for content, or engage in
other practices that harm internet openness”).
November 2016] VISUAL RULEMAKING 1185
commissioner droning on about the proposed rule,3 Oliver lambasted
the proceedings as “even boring by C-Span standards.”4 Despite the
tedium, Oliver insisted, net neutrality was vitally important, and he
made this point to his viewers by relying on a series of humorous
visuals, including images of Superman, fuzzy kittens, and one of a
babysitting dingo—a metaphor for the industry-captured FCC suppos-
edly taking care of the Internet.5 Oliver closed his piece with a call to
action, imploring Internet trolls to file comments with the FCC: “We
need you to get out there and for once in your lives, focus your indis-
criminate rage in a useful direction!”6 With an inspirational sound-
track playing in the background and the Internet address of the FCC
prominently displayed on the screen, he exhorted commenters to
“Turn on caps lock, and fly, my pretties! Fly, fly, fly!”7 And fly they
did: The FCC received tens of thousands of comments following
Oliver’s segment, at one point crashing the agency’s website.8
Notably, Oliver was not the only one to try to harness the power
of visuals to influence the FCC’s rulemaking. A few months later, as
the FCC was preparing to finalize its net neutrality rule, President
Obama published a video in which he urged the FCC to protect net
neutrality.9 Although critics charged that the President’s video inap-
propriately interfered with the deliberations of an independent
agency,10 the FCC seemed perfectly willing to listen. After taking both
3 John Oliver: Net Neutrality, supra note 1, at 1:11; see also Commissioner Michael
O’Rielly, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/general/commissioner-michael-
o’rielly [https://perma.cc/J56Z-GD36] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (providing information on
Commissioner Michael O’Rielly, whose address was shown in John Oliver’s segment).
4 Id. at 1:19–:26.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 12:59–13:15.
7 Id.
8 See Ben Brody, How John Oliver Transformed the Net Neutrality Debate Once and
for All, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/
articles/2015-02-26/how-john-oliver-transformed-the-net-neutrality-debate-once-and-for-
all [https://perma.cc/3W5W-SPWA] (discussing the impact John Oliver’s segment had on
the net neutrality debate).
9 The White House, President Obama’s Statement on Keeping the Internet Open and
Free, YOUTUBE (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKcjQPVwfDk
[hereinafter President’s Net Neutrality Video].
10 See, e.g., Mark W. Davis, Sneaky, Stealthy and Serpentine: The Obama
Administration Forced the FCC’s Hand on the Awful New Net Neutrality Rules, U.S. NEWS
(Feb. 27, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/mark-davis/2015/02/27/
obama-net-neutrality-underhanded-power-grab-is-bad-for-the-internet (arguing that
President Obama bullied the independent agency and compromised regulatory
independence in the process); Gautham Nagesh & Brody Mullins, Net Neutrality: How the
White House Thwarted FCC Chief, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:52 PM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/how-white-house-thwarted-fcc-chief-on-internet-rules-1423097522 (discussing
Obama’s interference in the net neutrality debate and the concerns by critics).
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the President’s message and nearly four million public comments into
account,11 the agency ultimately implemented a regulatory scheme
that looked very much like the plan Obama had proposed, which
favored strong net neutrality rules.12
This Article argues that visual appeals like those issued by the
President and Oliver are emblematic of an emerging and significant
phenomenon that has gathered momentum only within the last few
years: the use of visual media to develop, critique, and engender sup-
port for (or opposition to) high-stakes, sometimes virulently contro-
versial,13 federal rulemakings. These visual media include an evolving
range of multimedia communications, such as still images, videos,
infographics, and GIFs, many of which also contain auditory and tex-
tual elements. Visual communication has long served important,
sophisticated functions in the administrative arena.14 Yet visuals have
played little historical role in the rulemaking process. Instead, the rari-
fied realm of rulemaking has remained technocratic in its form—
defined by linear analysis, black-and-white text, and expert reports.
Now, due to the explosion of highly visual social media, we are on
the cusp of change. This Article uncovers a visual transformation in
rulemaking that has resulted in what might at first appear to be two
separate universes: On the one hand, the official rulemaking proceed-
ings, which even in the digital age remain text-bound, technocratic,
and difficult for lay citizens to comprehend, and on the other hand, a
newly visual—newly social—universe in which agencies, the
President, members of Congress, and public stakeholders sell their
regulatory ideas. But as the influence of the visuals deployed by
Oliver and Obama in the net neutrality rulemaking show, these uni-
verses are not in fact distinct. Visual rulemaking—even when it is
11 See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5604, 5796
n.1223 (2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf (noting that
the FCC was “[i]nformed by the views of nearly 4 million commenters,” and briefly
acknowledging “the President’s push for Title II reclassification”); Tom Wheeler, FCC
Chairman Tom Wheeler: This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2015,
11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality/ (noting
that nearly 4 million public comments were received).
12 See infra notes 310–13 and accompanying text (describing the strong net neutrality
principles in the final rule).
13 Thomas McGarity has previously observed that “high-stakes rulemaking has become
a ‘blood sport’ in which regulated industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are
willing to spend millions of dollars to shape public opinion and influence powerful political
actors to exert political pressure on agencies.” Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law
as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2012).
The new visual rulemaking world we uncover in this Article exacerbates these dynamics.
14 See infra Section I.A (discussing the communicative power of visuals).
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outside the four corners of official rulemaking proceedings—is
seeping into the technocracy.
This Article is the first not only to identify the emergence of this
more visual form of rulemaking, but also to analyze the significant
theoretical and doctrinal implications that it raises.15 In terms of
administrative law theory, we conclude that there are important justi-
fications supporting the new visual rulemaking culture. Most notably,
agencies’ uses of visuals to market their regulatory agendas—often in
direct coordination with the President’s sophisticated exploitation of
digital media—further two fundamental theoretical justifications
underpinning the regulatory state: transparency and political account-
ability. For instance, in August 2015, President Obama issued a
YouTube “Memo to America” in which he took political credit for the
highly controversial Clean Power Plan, omitting any mention of the
fact that the rule was promulgated by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).16 In the same vein, at the outset of its recently final-
ized overtime pay rulemaking,17 the Department of Labor (DOL)
posted a whiteboard video to its blog featuring a hand-drawn sketch
of President Obama directing the agency to “update the rules!”18
These visuals bring greater transparency and political accountability
to the regulatory state, helping Americans to understand the role that
the President plays in directing and influencing federal agency
rulemaking regarding key priorities, from workers’ overtime pay to
climate change.
In addition, these same visual tools have the potential to democ-
ratize public participation and to enable greater dialogue between
agencies and the public. Because visuals are easy to create and to
digest in today’s social media culture, visual rulemaking empowers a
broader range of stakeholders—not merely those privileged regula-
tory insiders who are well-equipped to navigate dense text.19 It also
enables agencies to compete with the narratives of powerful institu-
15 This Article focuses exclusively on informal notice-and-comment rulemaking
governed by Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
16 The White House, President Obama on America’s Clean Power Plan, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 2, 2015), https://youtu.be/uYXyYFzP4Lc [hereinafter Memo to America]; see also
infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (discussing Obama’s “Memo to America”).
17 Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,391 (May 23, 2016)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
18 Heidi Shierholz, Everything You Need to Know About Updating Overtime Pay, U.S.
DEP’T. OF LABOR: U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BLOG (July 8, 2015), http://blog.dol.gov/2015/07/
08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-updating-overtime-pay/; see also infra  notes
255–57 and accompanying text (displaying the hand-drawn sketch).
19 See infra Section I.A (discussing neuroscience literature on the seeming ease of
visual communication).
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tional stakeholders who might otherwise dominate political dialogue
on regulatory actions.
Despite these theoretical advantages, visual rulemaking raises
serious risks. Visual appeals may turn high-stakes rulemakings into
viral political battles, undermining the expert-driven foundation of the
regulatory state. Visuals may oversimplify complexities, appeal to
emotions over intellect, and fuel partisan politics.20
Visual rulemaking also implicates significant doctrinal questions.
As just one example, consider how in  December 2015, the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO) found that EPA had violated a
statutory prohibition on agency lobbying during a Thunderclap cam-
paign—a kind of virtual flash mob—that it unleashed in support of its
proposed Clean Water Rule.21 In addition to these lobbying and prop-
aganda prohibitions, we identify other key doctrinal road bumps to
the growth of visual rulemaking, including fundamental provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the First Amendment.22
While none of these doctrinal issues threatens to obstruct visual
rulemaking entirely, they do suggest that agencies’ use of visuals may
need to change some around the margins.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explains that despite
the widely acknowledged communicative power of images, visual
communication has long been missing from the rulemaking realm.
Deep-rooted assumptions about the solely textual nature of
rulemaking have prevented even e-rulemaking scholars from recog-
nizing the potential role that visual communication could play and
indeed is now playing. Part II draws on examples from recent high-
stakes rulemakings to demonstrate not only how key stakeholders in
the regulatory arena are now using images to achieve their regulatory
goals, but also how they are using visuals in different ways. These
20 See, e.g., Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y.
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html (last
updated Apr. 1, 2016) (interactive exercise showing how viewers’ interpretation of police
camera videos are influenced by the viewers’ perspective, narration, or pre-existing
beliefs). These effects are easily magnified by purposeful digital manipulation. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n, Forward, NPPA: THE VOICE OF VISUAL JOURNALISTS
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://blogs.nppa.org/ethics/2012/10/17/forward/ (describing how the
National Review “used a Reuters photo showing President Obama addressing the crowd at
the Democratic Convention as their October First cover, but they changed all the
FORWARD signs the people were holding into signs that said ABORTION,” and only
later revealed (when challenged) that the photograph had been altered).
21 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter on Environmental
Protection Agency’s Application of Publicity or Propaganda and Anti-Lobbying
Provisions, at 2 (Dec. 14, 2015) [hereinafter “U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO
B-326944, Opinion Letter”].
22 See infra Section III.B (discussing doctrinal implications).
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stakeholders include agencies and the President, as well as members
of Congress, industry representatives, and everyday Americans. Part
III identifies and critiques the significant theoretical and doctrinal
issues raised by visual rulemaking, explaining how different uses of
visuals raise different legal and theoretical questions. Ultimately, we
conclude that—while this very new phenomenon may unfold in unex-
pected and unforeseen ways—administrative law doctrine and theory
can and should welcome the arrival of visual rulemaking.
I
OVERLOOKING THE VISUAL IN RULEMAKING
As this Part describes, the communicative power of visuals is
widely recognized. Yet, at least until two or three years ago, visual
communication played little role in the rulemaking realm. Instead,
longstanding assumptions about the textual nature of rulemaking pre-
vented even e-rulemaking scholars from recognizing the emergence
and potential power of visual communication.
A. The Power of Visual Communication
Visuals matter because they pack a punch. Psychology and
neuroscience (not to mention personal experience) indicate that
visuals are efficient, powerful mechanisms for communicating even
complex ideas. Foremost, they are incredibly efficient at conveying
both information and emotion. This efficiency is partly a matter of
processing speed: We grasp visuals substantially faster than we can
read text—sometimes in less than a second.23 We also approach
visuals differently than we do text: we scan pictures, absorbing infor-
mation in a sweeping, gestalt manner—“at a glance”—in contrast to
the linearity and depth of traditional reading.24 In other words, visuals
can give us the big picture (literally and figuratively) without
23 See, e.g., NEIL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 7–8 (2009) (stating that people
can “get the gist of a visual display in a single fixation lasting less than a third of a
second”); STEVEN YANTIS, SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 262 (2014) (describing rapid
visual presentation experiments demonstrating that “the gist of a scene” can be acquired
even when the scene appears for only a fraction of a second); Christina M. Leclerc &
Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Neural Processing of Emotional Pictures and Words: A
Comparison of Young and Older Adults, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 519,
520 (2011) (stating that “[p]ictures tend to be processed more rapidly than words”).
Neuroscientists are still studying the precise pathways of this rapid cognition. See Kalanit
Grill-Spector & Rafael Malach, The Human Visual Cortex, 27 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE
649, 656 (2004) (noting that “[o]ne of the greatest mysteries in vision research is how
humans recognize visually presented objects with high accuracy and speed”).
24 Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1753
(2014).
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demanding that we trudge through pages of text. Understanding an
image might seem intuitive, even effortless.25
That sense of ease associated with the visual may be especially
valuable for explaining scientific or complex topics to non-experts, or
for organizing and conveying the significance of data.26 Infographics
and maps are visuals that are purposely designed to maximize this
visual efficiency. They allow viewers to compare alternative narratives
or data sets; to evaluate the evolution of a phenomenon over time
and/or space; and to understand the interaction between many vari-
ables in complex systems.27 Visual layering—“visually stratifying dif-
ferent aspects of the data”—declutters information, clarifying the
relationships between ideas or information.28 Infographics can also
provide multiple ways to ingest information; for example, a chart or
map can simultaneously invite a quick, “macro” reading and more lei-
surely, personal “micro-readings.”29
In addition to their efficiency, visuals are engaging.30 They
instantly and memorably convey emotion, from pathos to humor.31
And because they are tinged with emotion, we are more likely to
remember images than we are words.32 The combination of image,
text, and even sometimes sound can further an image’s emotional
effect, by either reinforcing an image’s meaning or exploiting the cog-
nitive dissonance between the image and the text.33 Together with this
25 Id.
26 EDWARD R. TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION 50 (2d
ed. 2001) [hereinafter TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY]; DONA M. WONG, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL GUIDE TO INFORMATION GRAPHICS 13 (2010) (“When a chart is presented
properly, information just flows to the viewer in the clearest and most efficient way.”).
27 TUFTE, VISUAL DISPLAY, supra note 26, at 15.
28 EDWARD R. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION 53 (1990) [hereinafter TUFTE,
ENVISIONING INFORMATION].
29 Id. at 37 (describing how a micro-reading is personal and detailed; it can involve
“individual stories about” data, in the context of a bigger—macro—picture).
30 See Jan De Houwer & Dirk Hermans, Differences in the Affective Processing of
Words and Pictures, 8 COGNITION & EMOTION 1, 1 (1994) (stating that images “have
privileged access to a semantic network containing affective information”); Claudia E.
Haupt, Active Symbols, 55 B.C. L. REV. 821, 848 (2014) (noting that fMRI research
confirms traditional psychological research finding that “pictures have a closer connection
to emotion than words and are processed faster than words for emotional information”).
31 See Haupt, supra note 30, at 825 (“Images are processed at higher rates than textual
components and they are more directly linked to emotion than text.”); Seth F. Kreimer,
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to
Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 343 (2011) (arguing that “shared images convey
information, perceptions, stories, or emotions; the stream of shared images establishes a
sense of ‘co-presence’ in correspondents’ lives”).
32 See Haupt, supra note 30, at 849 (noting that “emotionally charged pictures are
particularly easy to remember”).
33 See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 683, 691 (2012) (stating that “using pictures emphasizing one side of a
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emotional impact, images carry an implicit but strong sense of credi-
bility: Seeing is believing. Partly for that reason, and partly because of
the new ubiquity of photos and videos, images are playing an increas-
ingly central role in policy and legal debates. Almost eight years ago
in Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court for the first time embedded a
link to a police video into an opinion.34 From videos of police shoot-
ings35 to the photos of Abu Ghraib36 to the Syrian refugee crisis,37
visual documentation of an event frequently shapes public perceptions
and politics related to that event. This emotive power of images is
likely to increase as virtual reality jolts us out of two-dimensional
media.38
Notably, the strengths of visuals—their efficiency, their emo-
tional impact, their very naturalness—are also images’ greatest risks.
Because they seem so comfortable and easy, “we may stop looking
before we realize that critical thought should be applied to them.”39
Visuals can oversimplify complexities, distort facts, and manipulate
emotions.40 We may be able to think rationally about an event when
we read textual descriptions, but that rationality may not withstand a
visual depiction of the event. As neuroscientists have found, we do not
interpret images in a vacuum; to the contrary, we use “top-down infor-
mation”—information that flows from the viewer’s knowledge and
goals—to interpret images.41 This means that, to some extent, we per-
balanced news report . . . biases readers’ perceptions of contested issues in favor of the
pictured side”).
34 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007); cf. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837
(2009) (discussing the Court’s reasoning and contrasting such reasoning to a sample of
Americans’ reactions to the incident footage).
35 See Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1799–803 (2015)
(describing benefits and risks of increased video monitoring of police-civilian encounters).
36 See generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2085, 2091
(2005) (discussing graphic photos that were released to the public of tortured prisoners in
Abu Ghraib prison).
37 See Susan Ager, This Wouldn’t Be the First Time a Child’s Photo Changed History,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 3, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150903-
drowned-syrian-boy-photo-children-pictures-world/ (discussing impact of photo of
drowned Syrian three-year-old child who washed ashore in Turkey).
38 See Danfung Dennis, American Bison, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/opinion/sundance-new-frontiers-virtual-reality.html
(observing that in virtual reality, “we instinctively feel a surge of empathy for those whose
experiences we are immersed in”).
39 Tushnet, supra note 33, at 690.
40 See Porter, supra note 24, at 1754–56 (discussing how images often arouse emotions
more significantly than text and how one’s beliefs influence what one sees).
41 See YANTIS, supra note 23, at 144 (noting that visual perception combines “bottom-
up” information, which flows from the retina to the brain, with “top-down information,”
which flows “from higher regions to lower regions” in the brain, in order to recognize
visual stimuli); see also id. at 145 (explaining neuroscience finding that “the visual system
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ceive what we expect to perceive. For example, research has shown
that when people were thinking about beauty, “specific parts of the
brain responded to more attractive faces.”42 In addition, seemingly
extrinsic factors such as whether an image is color or black-and-white,
affect our ability to remember an image.43
Both the power and the risk of visuals have become more promi-
nent in recent years with the arrival of Web 2.0—which began around
2004 or 2005 with the founding of Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and
other social media.44 The emergence of digital media has fundamen-
tally altered the way that people ingest and share information.45 Our
cultural norms, and seemingly our brains, have been rewired to accli-
mate to the high-intensity, high-color Web in which we are now entan-
gled.46 Visual information is mobile, it is social, and it is influential.
Until recently, the law generally has underestimated the commu-
nicative value of images.47 It “has tended to identify . . . rationality
with texts rather than pictures, with reading words rather than
‘reading’ pictures, to the point that it is often thought that thinking in
words is the only kind of thinking there is.”48 As the next Section will
show, agency rulemaking has been no exception.
unconsciously applies two probabilities in order to infer what type of scene produced the
currently experienced retinal image: (1) the prior probability of all possible scenes and (2)
for each possible scene, the probability that it produced the current retinal image”).
42 ANJAN CHATTERJEE, THE AESTHETIC BRAIN: HOW WE EVOLVED TO DESIRE
BEAUTY AND ENJOY ART 76–77 (2013) (noting that the affected areas of the brain
“included the face area and the adjacent lateral occipital cortex that processes objects in
general”).
43 See ADAM ALTER, DRUNK TANK PINK 170 (2013); see also id. at 2–13 (noting that
the color “drunk tank pink” originates from findings that police drunk tanks painted bright
pink experienced fewer incidents of fights or aggression among detainees).
44 See DAVID CROTEAU, WILLIAM HOYNES & STEFANIA MILAN, MEDIA/SOCIETY:
INDUSTRIES, IMAGES, AND AUDIENCES 11 (4th ed. 2012) (listing major social media
platforms by year); JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS: SECRETS OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST
BILLIONAIRE ENTREPRENEURS SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY PAGE 294 (2009) (explaining
that “Web 2.0” describes “the proliferation of interconnectivity and social interaction on
the World Wide Web”).
45 See Porter, supra note 24, at 1719–20 (describing digital innovations and their impact
on how people read and interact with multimedia writing).
46 See NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR
BRAINS 141 (2011) (citing Patricia M. Greenfield, Technologies and Informal Education:
What Is Taught, What Is Learned, SCI., Jan. 2, 2009, at 69–71 (2009)) (arguing that digital
technologies are enhancing people’s visual-spatial intelligence but weakening our capacity
for deep processing and reflection).
47 See Porter, supra note 24, at 1699 (noting that, outside of trial, “text defines the
profession”).
48 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 23, at 4.
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B. Rulemaking: A Technocratic, Textual Tradition
Rulemaking has long been viewed as a text-based affair. To be
sure, rulemaking proceedings have historically included occasional
visuals, such as evidentiary exhibits or explanatory figures. In fact, the
very first volume of the Federal Register contained a diagram of a
“marine signal pistol” relating to rule amendments promulgated by an
agency within the Department of Commerce.49 Since that time, the
Federal Register has occasionally contained maps, charts, or diagrams,
and stakeholders and policymakers have naturally submitted com-
ments or evidence to rulemaking dockets that sometimes include
visual material.50 Moreover, on occasion, graphics have even entered
into final rules. For example, figures in the Code of Federal
Regulations depict requirements established by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission for flammability tests for mattresses,51
and the Code of Federal Regulations also includes depictions of
sample graphic labels created by EPA and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) concerning vehicles’ fuel efficiency.52 Yet, on
the whole, rulemaking has historically been, and remains, a text-
bound endeavor. As a result, neither rulemaking stakeholders nor
legal scholars studying rulemaking have been attuned to the potential
value of visual input into the regulatory process.
Notably, this dismissal of the visual has persisted despite agen-
cies’ longstanding recognition—outside of the rulemaking context—of
the power of visual tools. From the U.S. Army’s famous “I Want You”
poster53 to the long running Smokey Bear forest fire awareness cam-
49 Amendments to General Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Board of
Supervising Inspectors, 1 Fed. Reg. 441, 443 (May 23, 1936).
50 See, e.g., SCI. APPLICATIONS INT’L CORP., A GUIDE FOR THE INSPECTION OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS BY MOTOR VEHICLE OR AT FREIGHT FACILITIES 17,
apps. a, b (1988), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FMCSA-1997-2180-0052 (click
on attachment) (containing diagrams and charts and included as part of docket for
proposed rule on Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,418, 33,419
(proposed June 17, 1993) (not adopted)); WALDEMAR C. DREESSEN ET AL., U.S. PUB.
HEALTH SERV., PNEUMOCONIOSIS AMONG MICA AND PEGMATITE WORKERS 7, 8, 12, 13
(1940), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSHA-H020A-2006-0900-0313 (click on
pdf symbol) (serving as a reference material for proposed rule on Air Contaminants, 57
Fed. Reg. 26,002 (proposed June 12, 1992) (not adopted)).
51 16 C.F.R. § 1633 figs.1–17 (2016) (showing, among other information, required
structure of mattress testing equipment, and mandatory flammability labels for
mattresses).
52 49 C.F.R. § 575.401 app. (2014) (showing fuel economy labels for gasoline-fueled
vehicles).
53 The Most Famous Poster, AM. TREASURES OF THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://
www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm015.html (last visited July 13, 2016) (displaying the
famous U.S. Army “I Want You” poster, which was created by James Flagg and originally
published in 1916).
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paign,54 the publicly oriented arm of agencies has routinely harnessed
the power of visuals in creative and sometimes poignant ways to
market their overall missions and to educate the American public.55
Indeed, agencies’ uses of visuals to market their agendas have some-
times pushed the envelope so far that they have elicited the ire of
Congress. One such example involves agencies’ use of “video news
releases,” or VNRs, to disseminate news. VNRs were agency-
produced, pre-packaged news reports disseminated to news broad-
casters across the nation for insertion into programs.56 Under George
W. Bush, agencies created VNRs that looked like real newscasts, but
in which the “reporters” were actually agency employees promoting
the President’s legislative goals, such as Medicare legislation. At
Congress’s request, GAO investigated the matter and ultimately
found that these fake news segments were a prohibited form of propa-
ganda under federal law.57 This example shows that agencies are well
aware of—and willing to exploit—the power of the visual. But the
public facing, publicity arm of agencies generally did not reach into
the regulatory realm.
Rulemaking’s fixation with text persisted despite the arrival of
Web 2.0 and the explosion of new modes of visual communication. In
2003, the government launched Regulations.gov, which for the first
time housed all rulemaking activity in a single website that allows the
public to perform fundamental rulemaking tasks, including searching
and submitting comments electronically.58 President Obama’s Open
54 See, e.g., Smokey’s History, SMOKEY BEAR, http://www.smokeybear.com/vault/
#!prettyPhoto[1960sP]/0/ [https://perma-archives.org/warc/M5ZP-AYGX] (last visited July
13, 2016) (displaying an early Smokey Bear image).
55 See, e.g., Carolyn Puckett, Administering Social Security: Challenges Yesterday and
Today, 70 SOC. SECURITY BULL. (Soc. Sec. Admin., Washington, D.C.), no. 3, 2010, at 27,
29–30, 32, 34, 37 (2010), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/v70n3p27.html [https://
perma.cc/536E-PM45] (displaying pictures from the history of the Social Security
Administration); Historical Photos and Images, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/aboutepa/historical-photos-and-images [https://perma.cc/QSR7-KE8P] (last
visited July 15, 2016) (providing photos from EPA’s “Documerica Project,” which
“record[ed] the state of the environment and efforts to improve it”); Social Security
History, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history/comic1969.html (last visited
July 16, 2016) (reprinting 1969 comic book from Social Security Administration).
56 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG.,
Analysis of the First Year of the Obama Administration: Public Relations and Propaganda
Initiatives 6–7 (Aug. 16, 2010), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/
8-16-2010_Propaganda_Report.pdf (discussing the use of propaganda in the Clinton
administration).
57 Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., B-302710,
2004 WL 1114403, at *11 (Comp. Gen. May 19, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/
302710.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG8M-2PLB].
58 See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–347, § 206, 116 Stat. 2899, 2915–16
(establishing eRulemaking Program); About Us , REGULATIONS.GOV, https://
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Government Memorandum, issued on his first day in office, further
reinforced the ideals embodied by these digital rulemaking initia-
tives.59 Scholars and policymakers were optimistic that these digital
innovations would advance the rulemaking ideals of transparency and
public participation, “open[ing] the political imagination to better
ways of organizing, not simply documents, but the interpersonal rela-
tionships of the rulemaking process.”60 In many ways, however, the
promise of a more participatory, newly dialogic rulemaking culture
has not been fulfilled.61 Although there is some evidence that the
number of public comments has increased, at least in certain high-
profile proceedings, there is no strong indication that the shift to a
digital docket has expanded the number of influential comments, or
that it has significantly improved the public’s awareness of or respect
for the regulatory process.62
Scholars have considered many possible reasons for this anti-
climax. They have noted, for example, that everyday citizens might be
deterred from participating in rulemaking due to information over-
load, ignorance about agencies and regulations, or ignorance of the
existence of a rulemaking.63 But scholars have not suggested, and
have not seriously considered, the role that visuals might play in
democratizing or making more transparent the process of creating
federal regulations. In fact, in his recent report to the Administrative
www.regulations.gov/aboutProgram [https://perma.cc/69P6-R5GA] (last visited July 16,
2016) (describing the eRulemaking Program).
59 See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 2009 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 14 (Jan. 21, 2009) (stating that the government should be transparent,
participatory, and collaborative).
60 Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
435 (2004); see also MICHAEL HERZ, USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING:
POSSIBILITIES AND BARRIERS 2 (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Herz%20Social%20Media%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYN3-
3X3E] (noting that many expected e-rulemaking to “make rulemaking not just more
efficient, but also more broadly participatory, democratic, and dialogic”).
61 See HERZ, supra note 60, at 14 (“[M]embers of the public remain largely unaware
and uninformed about the process and particular rulemakings and do not know how to
make useful contributions, there is no back-and-forth among commenters or between
commenters and the agency, and the process remains largely sealed off from the
public . . . .”).
62 See Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future,
55 DUKE L.J. 943, 954–59 (2006) (discussing studies and other evidence suggesting that e-
commenting has not increased the level of citizen comments or participation).
63 See generally Cynthia Farina et al., Democratic Deliberation in the Wild: The McGill
Online Design Studio and the RegulationRoom Project, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527,
1549–65 (2014) (describing efforts to lower barriers including lack of awareness and
information overload).
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Conference of the United States (ACUS)64 on the role of social media
in rulemaking, scholar Michael Herz dismissed the potential of image-
driven communication to inform or influence rulemaking. As Herz
put it: “[O]ne of the defining characteristics of social media is that it is
multi-media and therefore allows communication other than through
words. That is breathtaking and wonderful and valuable in many set-
tings. But writing regulations just is not one of them.”65 Like scholars
more generally,66 Herz has overlooked the visual.
In accordance with this text-focused tradition, efforts to make
rulemaking more engaging and accessible have been almost entirely
text-focused. Consider Federalregister.gov, an award-winning67 web-
site that features clean logos, color images drawn from Flickr, and
even a “most viewed/most emailed” list.68 In becoming more search-
able and more comprehensible to a non-expert viewer, the online
Register is indeed a huge leap forward. But when it comes to the
actual regulatory process, entries in Federalregister.gov are visually
identical to their textual counterparts: lengthy, in rather narrow col-
umns and filled with dense, highly technical text. And the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs’ 2012 attempt to make regula-
tions more comprehensible by requiring executive summaries of cer-
tain proposed rules has not helped.69 One empirical analysis found
that such executive summaries were “significantly less readable” than
64 ACUS is an independent federal agency whose mission is to improve the
administrative process through applied research. About the Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS), ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., https://www.acus.gov/about-
administrative-conference-united-states-acus (last visited July 17, 2016).
65 HERZ, supra note 60, at 24.
66 For instance, Cynthia Farina and others at Cornell’s e-Rulemaking Initiative (CeRI)
have developed RegulationRoom, a digital laboratory aimed at developing new ways of
increasing public participation in the regulatory process. See RegulationRoom, CORNELL
UNIV., http://regulationroom.org/ (last visited July 17, 2016). While RegulationRoom has
made creative efforts to simplify and explain regulatory text, it sticks closely to the textual
template of the proposed rules themselves. See id. (lacking a platform to accept visual
comments or input); see also Farina et al., supra note 63, at 1546 (explaining how the
RegulationRoom team “analyzed the original rulemaking documents and created ten
‘topic posts,’” which “used more concise language to explain the problems” at issue in the
rulemaking).
67 See Michael White, Bright Idea Award: Harvard JFK School Recognizes Federal
Register 2.0, FED. REG. (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/blog/2012/09/
bright-idea-award-harvard-jfk-school-recognizes-federal-register-2-0 [https://perma.cc/
T6G3-5V5X] (announcing that Federal Register 2.0 was recognized for the “Bright Idea
Award” by the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, part of the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University).
68 FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
69 See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Jan. 4, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/clarifying-regulatory-requirements_executive-
summaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MFP-SKWT] [hereinafter Memorandum from Sunstein]
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the preambles to the rules themselves.70 In fact, even when agencies
draft regulations that specifically require graphic warnings or labels,
those images may not appear in the agency’s notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM), the draft rule, or the finalized regulation.71
We believe there are multiple factors undergirding this deep,
implicit assumption that visual technology has no valuable role in
rulemaking. First, regulation is largely a legal and technical
endeavor—both fields in which written analysis and specialized lan-
guages are defining aspects of the profession. In almost every context
outside of trial, law is a typographic, semantic field. Legal textbooks
rarely contain images; statutes and regulatory codes are overwhelm-
ingly textual; and litigation documents, legal scholarship, and judicial
opinions are, almost by definition, exclusively textual.72 In the context
of rulemaking, these typographic cultural traditions are further rein-
forced by an “expertise-based” model, “which view[s] agencies as pro-
fessional, apolitical experts.”73 Courts performing judicial review of
agency decisions tend to view regulations in such “expert-driven
terms.”74 Although a number of scholars now acknowledge a place for
politics in agency rulemaking,75 this more nuanced theoretical under-
standing has not permeated the nuts and bolts of the actual
rulemaking process, which continues to look and feel staunchly tech-
nocratic. Thus, while agencies have long felt comfortable deploying
visuals to market and to promote overarching governmental goals,
such as educating Americans about the dangers of forest fires or
(stating that proposed and final rules should contain “straightforward executive
summaries”).
70 Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart & Cheryl Blake, The Problem with Words: Plain
Language and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1358, 1405
(2015) (describing executive summary rule as a “regulatory misfire”).
71 See, e.g., Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed.
Reg. 36,628, 36,680 n.5 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) (explaining
where electronic files containing graphic cigarette warning labels could be found).
72 See Porter, supra note 24, at 1700 (describing legal discourse as “text-centered”).
73 Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 15 (2009).
74 Id. at 19–21.
75 See, e.g., id. at 7–9 (proposing that arbitrary and capricious review should be
“expanded to include certain political influences from the President, other executive
officials, and members of Congress,” as long as they are disclosed in the record); see also
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY  (1990); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency
Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1128–31 (2010) (calling for agencies to
summarize executive influence on significant rule-making decisions).
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mobilizing wartime support,76 only now is this visual—and somewhat
political—approach migrating into the regulatory realm.
II
THE AD HOC EMERGENCE OF VISUAL RULEMAKING
This Part demonstrates the emergence of a new visual rulemaking
culture that contrasts starkly with the text-bound traditions that have
long prevailed. Agencies, the President, Congress, members of the
public, and repeat-player institutions are all using the tools of the
modern, quintessentially visual, information age to wield influence
over the regulatory state. And while it might appear that this colorful
and social rulemaking world is wholly divorced from its technocratic,
textual rulemaking counterpart, this distinction does not hold. The
two worlds are bleeding into each other.
A. Agencies
As might be expected given the enormous size and diversity of
the federal bureaucracy,77 not all regulatory agencies have embraced
visuals in the same way. Some agencies are doing very little, if any-
thing, to harness the power of visual communication in the context of
their rulemaking proceedings. The FCC, which somewhat ironically
bills itself as the nation’s primary authority for “technological innova-
tion,”78 is one such agency. The FCC does have Facebook,79 Twitter,80
YouTube,81 and Flickr82 accounts, but it only occasionally posts visual
76 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (discussing agencies’ history of using
visuals to market their missions).
77  Hundreds of federal agencies exist. See Federal Agencies & Commissions, THE
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/federal-agencies-and-commissions
[https://perma.cc/U945-BHRS] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016). Some implement their missions
primarily through adjudication, others through rulemaking, and some use a mix of both.
See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1399 (2004) (contrasting the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which rely heavily on adjudication; with the FCC, which
relies primarily on rules; and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which
relies on both).
78 The FCC’s Mission, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview
[https://perma.cc/28D7-3QAH] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
79 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/FCC [https://
perma.cc/9V3L-VAYS] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
80 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (@FCC), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/FCC [https://
perma.cc/QQ3S-EZ78] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
81 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCCdotgovvideo, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/
user/fccdotgovvideo [https://perma.cc/C9U2-GH95] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
82 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/photos/fccdotgov/ [https://
perma.cc/66UG-VDVA] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
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communications tied to its rulemaking proceedings.83 Indeed, its
online visual presence consists almost entirely of yawn-inducing
images of speakers wearing suits as they sit or stand in front of micro-
phones at workshops, meetings and employee-of-the-year events.84
Other agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, similarly fall on the visually lack-
luster end of the spectrum.85 Rarely do these agencies’ visual postings
have anything to do with their rulemaking activities.86
At the other end of the spectrum, an evolving group of more visu-
ally adventurous agencies—nearly all of which are executive agencies
under the control of the President—is beginning to deploy the power
of visuals in the context of high-stakes, politically charged rulemaking
proceedings. These agencies—which currently include, among others,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),87 DOT,88 DOL,89 and
83 See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FACEBOOK (June 12, 2015), https://www.facebook
.com/FCC/photos/pb.127812519670.-2207520000.1454287157./10153048168774671/
?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/7N4Y-27WT?type=image] (showing image of gavel
accompanied by text announcing FCC’s Open Internet Rules).
84 See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCCdotgovvideo, supra note 81 (featuring video
of speaker at a podium).
85 See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (@FERC), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://twitter.com/FERC/status/542728963484049408 [https://perma.cc/R6EA-BTBS]
(providing photo of award recipients); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (@FERCgov),
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCo9LfvEBzLB7kIX85e-7GKQ/videos
[https://perma.cc/E678-M7NW] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (posting videos of speakers at
meetings); U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/photos/ustreasury/
[https://perma.cc/4HQC-RR2G] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (posting many photos of
speakers wearing suits).
86 But see U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, FACEBOOK (Oct. 21, 2015), https://
www.facebook.com/ustreasury/photos/pb.128956403810041.-2207520000.1454353142./
1000961269942879/?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/G9Y4-RM4G?type=image] (posting
photo of building and accompanying text discussing Treasury’s proposed regulations
involving tax treatment of same-sex spouses).
87 See, e.g., FDA Proposes New Safety Measures for Indoor Tanning Devices: The Facts,
U.S. FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm350790.htm [https://
perma.cc/8HPX-7FQJ] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (including link to video on risks of
indoor tanning); Food Serving Sizes Get a Reality Check, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM387442.pdf [https://
perma.cc/82WQ-R4XP] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (providing FDA infographic on new
food serving size standards); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FACEBOOK (Nov. 17, 2015), https:/
/www.facebook.com/FDA/photos/a.411715387298.184452.94399502298/101537227922872
99/?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/8X25-2AHC?type=image] (posting images of food
related to rulemaking on labels for gluten-free foods).
88 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FACEBOOK (Dec. 8, 2015) https://www.facebook.com/
USDOT/photos/a.10151397472936779.529479.63235616778/10153766384016779/
?type=3&theater (including photo of car that crashed into rear of truck in post relating to
rulemaking); U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FACEBOOK (June 5, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/
USDOT/photos/a.10151397472936779 .529479.63235616778/10153380360816779/?type=3&
theater [https://perma.cc/GF83-V8NS?type=image] (including photo of truck with its
wheels tipping up off the ground in post related to electronic stability control rule); U.S.
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EPA90—are not monolithic in their use of visuals. Nonetheless,
exploring their collective visual exploits makes clear that rulemaking
is no longer a solely textual endeavor. To the contrary, as we demon-
strate in this Section, agencies are deploying visuals in three primary
ways. First, the predominant use of visuals in rulemaking by agencies
involves what we call informational “outflow,” by which we mean
agencies’ dissemination of information about proposed and final rules
to constituents.91 Second, agencies are occasionally using visuals to
encourage what we call informational “inflow”—meaning the flow of
information from rulemaking stakeholders to agencies.92  Third, some
agencies are engaging in what we call visual “overflow,” which occurs
when agencies use visuals to nudge Congress to take action that is
aligned with, but outside the scope of, the agencies’ delegated
authority.93 Overflow spills over the edges of specific rulemaking pro-
ceedings into the legislative arena.
1. Outflow
The most prominent way in which agencies are deploying visuals
in the rulemaking context involves what we call the “outflow” of
information from agencies to interested parties. Outflow-oriented
visuals enable agencies to tell—and to sell—their rulemaking stories
to the American people, often to counter the narratives offered by
industry or other institutionalized stakeholders. While agencies have
long used publicity tools such as video news releases and posters to
engender support for their overall missions,94 this kind of regulatory
“outflow,” which markets proposed or potential rulemakings, is new.
Although a variety of agencies are disseminating visual outflow,95 two
have been at the forefront of this emerging trend: DOL and EPA.
Dep’t of Transp., FACEBOOK (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/USDOT/photos/
a.10151397472936779.529479.63235616778/10153778352851779/?type=3&theater [https://
perma.cc/NRQ6-S22Q?type=image] (including photo of drone in post about new
unmanned aircraft registration rules).
89 See infra notes 96–118 and accompanying text (discussing visual examples drawn
from Department of Labor (DOL) rulemaking proceedings).
90 See infra notes 119–50 and accompanying text (discussing visual examples drawn
from EPA rulemaking proceedings).
91 See infra Section II.A.1.
92 See infra Section II.A.2.
93 See infra Section II.A.3.
94 See supra notes 53–57 (discussing agencies’ use of video news releases and posters).
95 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Green Guides, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2012), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxzanX8PMXI (video describing FTC’s Green Guides); Matt
Trott, Celebrating and Protecting Salamanders, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.: OPEN SPACES
(Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.fws.gov/news/blog/index.cfm/2016/1/15/Celebrating-and-
Protecting-Salamanders [https://perma.cc/MPG2-U5JF] (blog entry with pictures of
salamanders to announce their designation as injurious wildlife); Nat’l Highway Traffic
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a. Department of Labor
In a variety of recent, highly controversial rulemakings, DOL has
used everything from emotional videos to humorous GIFs to persuade
everyday Americans about the need for and benefits of its regulatory
actions. Consider, for example, DOL’s recently finalized “overtime
pay” rule.96 The overtime rule significantly expands the overtime pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),97 extending “over-
time protections to nearly five million white collar workers.”98 DOL
published its NPRM in the Federal Register in July 2015.99 Not sur-
prisingly, the NPRM consists of nearly 100 pages of intimidating text,
dotted only occasionally by black-and-white charts, graphs, and tables.
However, just two days after publication of the NPRM, the agency
posted something that looked and felt entirely different: a whiteboard
video.100 The under-four-minute video, which DOL posted to its
YouTube channel and its blog, depicts an animator’s hand drawing
simple sketches on a whiteboard, accompanied by upbeat music and a
voiceover by DOL’s chief economist. The sketches visually explain in
a very simple and high-level manner how overtime works and why
updates to overtime protections would help millions of Americans.101
For example, one scene shows a worker and his briefcase falling off
the edge of a cracked floor:
Safety Admin. (@NHTSAgov), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2015), https://twitter.com/NHTSAgov/
status/674307226207715328/photo/1 [https://perma.cc/MFY8-APNH] (image of intact
crash-test dummies next to destroyed vehicle); U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Smarter Snacks for
School Children, YOUTUBE (June 27, 2013), https://youtu.be/6bKP4xluxYc (video with
images of kids eating healthy snacks to announce new USDA rule); U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Listing the Lion , YOUTUBE (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_cOUvXi6NPk (video describing the extension of the endangered species act to
lions).
96 See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,391 (May 23, 2016)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541) (publishing final overtime rule).
97 See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219; see also
Presidential Memorandum Updating & Modernizing Overtime Regulations, 3 C.F.R. 351
(2014).
98 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Overtime, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol
.gov/whd/overtime/NPRM2015Archive/ [https://perma.cc/A5QB-Z86N] (last visited Aug.
5, 2016).
99 Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 38,516 (proposed July
6, 2015) [hereinafter Defining and Delimiting Exemptions] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
541).
100 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, White Board Explainer: What is Overtime?, YOUTUBE (July 8,
2015), https://youtu.be/KfINs8Fr9c8; see also Shierholz, supra note 18 (posting video to
Department of Labor Blog).
101 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 100, at 02:46 (noting that protection will cover
“almost five million workers”).
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SKETCH FROM DOL’S WHITEBOARD VIDEO ON OVERTIME, 2015102
A voiceover states: “For decades, overtime pay has been the cor-
nerstone of the middle class. But this foundation has weakened over
the years and no longer lifts up as many workers as it can or should.
That’s why the Department of Labor is updating the overtime
rules.”103 In another scene, the video explains that the rule changes
would extend overtime pay to almost five million people—and, by
merely adding little bits of hair and graduation caps to the heads of
otherwise rudimentary stick figures—the video easily demonstrates
that over half of these workers are women and over half have at least
a college degree:
SKETCHES FROM DOL’S WHITEBOARD VIDEO ON OVERTIME,
2015104
102 Id. at 00:43; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1464.
103 Id. at 00:26.
104 Id. at 02:48 (showing number of people affected); id. at 02:53 (showing how many
affected are women or people with college degrees). Images available at http://
www.nyulawreview.org/media/1497.
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Other than briefly flashing DOL’s overtime web page address,105
nothing in the video explains where viewers can access the actual text
of the proposed rule, or submit comments on the proposed rule. In
addition, the video carefully avoids complex issues, such as cost-
benefit analysis, that fill pages and pages of the NPRM.106 In this
sense, the video speaks to everyday Americans—not to knowledge-
able lawyers and industry insiders—in an effort to show what DOL is
doing to protect them.
Another DOL-created visual—an animated GIF that filled the
entire front page of DOL’s overtime webpage prior to DOL’s finaliza-
tion of the rule107—reinforced the same message.108 The GIF flashed
between an image of “Jason”—a father with a family to feed—
sporting today’s hipster beard and skinny jeans, carrying just one bag
of groceries, and an alternate image of Jason’s dad back in the 1970s,
wearing bell-bottoms and sideburns, carrying three bags of groceries:
“THEN & NOW” GIF POSTED TO DOL’S OVERTIME WEB PAGE109
105 Id. at 03:38 (directing viewers to DOL’s website at dol.gov/overtime).
106 See Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 99.
107 After the rule was finalized, DOL changed the image on its overtime webpage to a
video about “Sam” and “Mattie,” which illustrates how the final rule will help workers.
See OVERTIME: It’s About Time, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/featured/
overtime/ (last visited June 10, 2016).
108 See Rewarding Hard Work, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/
overtime-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/A98U-BASX] (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
109 Id.; images available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1495.
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The accompanying text explained: “When Jason was young, his
father worked full time, but didn’t have the same struggles. That’s
because Jason’s father qualified for and was paid overtime when he
worked more than 40 hours per week, and was able to make enough
to afford the basics for his family.”110 Drawing on both humor and
emotions, the GIF quickly and effectively conveyed DOL’s message
that American families need the agency’s help.
DOL has relied on the power of visuals to sell its story in other
high-profile rulemakings too. For example, DOL’s recently completed
“fiduciary duty” rulemaking111 was filled with visuals. DOL’s fiduciary
duty rule, which had stirred up a great deal of political controversy
and is currently being challenged in court,112 requires retirement advi-
sors to avoid conflicts of interest.113 When DOL published its 33-page
NPRM in the Federal Register in 2015,114 it also posted a short one-
minute video titled “Are Your Retirement Savings at Risk?” to its
blog.115 A few months later, DOL posted a three-minute whiteboard
video to YouTube.116 In addition, DOL’s website on the rulemaking
featured a moving video of a real woman, Ethel Sprouse, explaining
that when her husband was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, she
110 Id.
111 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015)
[hereinafter Definition of “Fiduciary”] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509–10); see also
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 2509–2510, 2550).
112 See Legislative Efforts to Stop DOL Fiduciary Rule Destined to Fail, ERISA Attorney
Says, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160204/
FREE/160209961/legislative-efforts-to-stop-dol-fiduciary-rule-destined-to-fail (describing
legislative efforts to stop “controversial” rule); Anna Prior, Labor Department’s Fiduciary
Proposal: Key Provisions to Watch, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2015, 8:01 AM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/labor-departments-fiduciary-proposal-key-provisions-to-watch-
1443700801 (describing battle over rule as “fierce”); Jacklyn Wille, Labor Department
Faces Five Lawsuits Over Fiduciary Duty Rule, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 10, 2016), http://
www.bna.com/labor-department-faces-n57982073912/ (stating that “five separate lawsuits
now attack the rule from seemingly every angle, from the way the department approached
the rule-making process to the way the rule restricts the speech of investment
professionals”).
113 See Are Your Retirement Savings at Risk?, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.
dol.gov/featured/protectyoursavings/ [https://perma.cc/YY8N-GW7Y] (last visited Feb. 17,
2016) (video explaining requirement that retirement investors avoid conflicts).
114 See Definition of “Fiduciary,” supra note 111.
115 Secretary Tom Perez & Jeffrey Zients, Today’s Important Step to Strengthen
Retirement Security, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015), https://blog.dol.gov/
2015/04/14/strengthening-retirement-security/ [https://perma.cc/C4ZS-PXHG]. DOL also
posted the same video to YouTube in February 2015 just before its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) was published in the Federal Register. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Are
Your Retirement Savings at Risk?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2015), https://youtu.be/
dBs6H1P7Wd0.
116 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 100.
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turned to a financial advisor, who cost her family hundreds of
thousands of dollars:
ETHEL SPROUSE’S STORY, 2015117
In the video, Ethel—a grandmotherly figure dressed in a car-
digan—shows viewers how retirement advisors’ conflicts of interest
can create very real problems for everyday citizens, requiring a real
governmental solution, not just regulatory jargon.118
b. Environmental Protection Agency
Like DOL, EPA has frequently leveraged visual media to pro-
mote contemporary, high-profile rulemakings. These rulemakings
have involved everything from ozone standards119 to mercury and air
117 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Working to Protect Your Retirement Savings: Ethel Sprouse’s
Story, YOUTUBE (Sept. 2, 2015), https://youtu.be/K-jV-tVAmDY. Image available at http://
www.nyulawreview.org/media/1448.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Explains Proposed Smog
Standards to Protect Americans’ Health , YOUTUBE (Nov. 26, 2014), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=psAQULm5WcU; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Ozone
Standards Protect Public Health, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v= Y6chlLb59zA.
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toxics.120 Its two most visually infused rulemakings, however, have
involved the Clean Power Plan121 and the Clean Water Rule.122
From the outset of its Clean Power Plan rulemaking, EPA
unleashed a torrent of visuals aimed at marketing its proposed rule to
the public. For instance, at the same time that it released its NPRM,123
EPA posted a whiteboard video titled “Clean Power Plan Explained”
to its YouTube channel.124 The video uses basic drawings to illustrate
how EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan will “boost our economy, pro-
tect our health and environment and fight climate change.”125
Although it closes by telling viewers that EPA wants “you to be part
of the conversation” and by directing viewers to EPA’s website for
more information,126 it does not explicitly suggest that viewers file
rulemaking comments. The video seems primarily aimed at per-
suading viewers about the value of EPA’s actions, not at drawing them
into the rulemaking process.
EPA also used social media to disseminate colorful
infographics,127 photographs,128 and videos about its Clean Power
120 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Mercury and Air Toxics Standards,
YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sx0vvn_Wn8o; U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Jerome Bettis, YOUTUBE (Jan. 5, 2012) https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=xegEGTsndcY (featuring NFL player Jerome Bettis speaking about EPA
mercury and air toxics standards).
121 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
122 See generally Clean Water Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule [https://perma.cc/F3HM-WZS4] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016)
(describing the scope and details of EPA’s Clean Water Rule).
123 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing “emission guidelines for states to follow in developing plans to
address greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units”).
124 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Power Plan Explained, YOUTUBE (June 2, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcNTGX_d8mY.
125 Id. at 00:24–00:30.
126 Id. at 02:58.
127 See, e.g., U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (Sept. 24, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/
status/514806567141908481 [https://perma.cc/BUR2-4U95] (posting infographic illustrating
the health benefits of proposed Clean Power Plan); U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (June 4,
2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/474253944597000192 [https://perma.cc/9ZXM-JAJ9]
(tweeting colorful chart depicting sources of power); U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (June 3,
2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/473919089900285953 (showing drawings from EPA’s
whiteboard video on proposed Clean Power Plan); U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (June 2,
2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/473528421201752064 [https://perma.cc/B58L-U8A3]
(sharing infographic touting the benefits of proposed Clean Power Plan).
128 See, e.g., U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (June 10, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/
status/476402164169191424 [https://perma.cc/T5S3-DH59] (reproducing photo of EPA
Administrator talking with reporters about proposed Clean Power Plan).
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Plan.129 Again, these visuals did not seek participation in the
rulemaking. Instead, they visually marketed the benefits of EPA’s pro-
posed plan, enabling the agency to push its own political narrative out
to the American people:
EPA TWEETS ABOUT PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN, 2014130
When EPA announced in August 2015 that it was finalizing the
Clean Power Plan, a slew of additional visuals followed.131 In one
emotional video, a young girl, who recounts lying awake crying at
night with asthma, says to the camera: “When I have kids, I hope it’s
gonna be easy for them to breathe.”132 At another point, EPA
Administrator Gina McCarthy states: “They need to know that
someone has their back. That’s what the Clean Power Plan is all
about. It doesn’t matter where you live or how much money you
make.”133 This powerful combination of words and images aims to
129 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy Signs
Proposal to Cut Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants, YOUTUBE (June 2, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGUIQ9I_VU0&feature=youtu.be; U.S. EPA
(@EPA), TWITTER (June 4, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/474169813607383041
[https://perma.cc/4GCW-2GN4] (tweeting a video of EPA Administrator announcing
proposed Clean Power Plan).
130 U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (June 2, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/
473528421201752064 [https://perma.cc/B58L-U8A3] (on left); U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/514806567141908481 [https://perma.cc/
BUR2-4U95] (on right). Images available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1447.
131 Interestingly, these visuals did not stop once EPA’s final rule issued. See, e.g., U.S.
EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2016), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/
687278131208712192 [https://perma.cc/47VV-NLX9] (tweeting an infographic touting how
the Clean Power Plan “will help to encourage more clean energy growth”).
132 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Clean Power Plan Protects Our Health & Our Air,
YOUTUBE, at 02:29 (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-rqu21-f7Qus.
133 Id. at 02:00.
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persuade viewers that the action EPA is taking is essential not only to
protect the health of our environment but also the health of rising
generations of everyday Americans.
A second high-profile, visually infused rulemaking from EPA is
the recently completed clean water rulemaking (also referred to as the
“Waters of the U.S.” or “WOTUS” rulemaking).134 During that
rulemaking, EPA splashed a variety of visuals across social media. The
visuals, which ranged from videos135 to infographics136 and
photographs137 to a social media Thunderclap campaign,138 repre-
sented a highly coordinated effort to convince America that
#CleanWaterRules, featuring everything from a fly fisherman139 to a
boat skimming across the water toward an idyllic sunset140 to local
beer:
134 The WOTUS rulemaking was a joint rulemaking between EPA and the Department
of Defense. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified in scattered parts of 33 C.F.R. and 40 C.F.R.).
135 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Water Act Protections Under the Proposed
Rule, YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://youtu.be/QasJw_O9DNA; U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Clean Water and Agriculture, YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=iKqXQReYyUI; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator McCarthy
Gives an Overview of EPA’s Clean Water Act Rule Proposal, YOUTUBE (Mar. 25, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ow-n8zZuDYc; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA White
Board: Clean Water Act Rule Proposal Explained, YOUTUBE (Mar. 25, 2014), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOUESH_JmA0; U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (June 10,
2015), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/608685734086778881 [https://perma.cc/6LSL-S85K]
(attaching a video to support its claim that the rule will protect drinking water).
136 See, e.g., U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (June 4, 2015), https://twitter.com/
EPAwater/status/606515913077215233 [https://perma.cc/RT6R-SMV9] (tweeting a map
showing areas in which the drinking water sources will be protected under the Clean Water
Rule); U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (May 26, 2015), https://twitter.com/
EPAwater/status/603300591113216000 [https://perma.cc/2473-4MP8] (showing a colorful
chart of the benefits of the Clean Water Rule for recreation).
137 See, e.g., U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (May 21, 2015), https://
twitter.com/EPAwater/status/601467780114751489 (posting an image of a leaf floating in a
river); see also U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (May 4, 2015), https://twitter.com/
EPAwater/status/595315441075093504 [https://perma.cc/RH4E-PHGL] (showing an image
of river rafters); U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER  (Oct. 15, 2014), https://
twitter.com/EPAwater/status/522451417161019392 [https://perma.cc/DA4F-ASGC]
(displaying an image of a waterfall).
138 See infra notes 434–41 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA’s Thunderclap
campaign).
139 U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (Apr. 27, 2015), https://twitter.com/
EPAwater/status/592688337489649665 [https://perma.cc/R6E7-Y72A].
140 U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (May 6, 2015), https://twitter.com/
EPAwater/status/596015277848055808 [https://perma.cc/8P6Y-WWB5].
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EPA #CLEANWATERRULES TWEET, 2015141
Interestingly, many of the visuals that EPA circulated during its
Clean Water Act rulemaking were responses to public feedback on its
proposed rule. For example, while the comment period was still open,
EPA tweeted about various videos that outside parties had issued in
support of the proposed rule.142 Furthermore, when faced with a vehe-
ment #DitchTheRule campaign143 unleashed by the American Farm
Bureau—an organization that represents farmers and ranchers and
that advocates on their behalf about issues related to agriculture in the
United States—EPA fired back with its own highly visual campaign
141 U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (May 26, 2015), https://twitter.com/
EPAwater/status/603303236456558592 [https://perma.cc/3WS2-WRJL]. Image available at
http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1442.
142 See, e.g., U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2014), https://
twitter.com/EPAwater/status/504640273713205248 [https://perma.cc/NJ79-JFAD] (“Watch
this video from farmers who support our proposal to protect clean water.”); U.S. EPA
Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (Aug. 16, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPAwater/status/
500702339121303552 [https://perma.cc/9898-H338] (“Listen to this support for our clean
water proposal.”).
143 See infra notes 225–30 and accompanying text (discussing #DitchTheRule and
#DitchTheMyth campaigns).
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called #DitchTheMyth, which used a variety of infographics144 and
videos145 to counter the American Farm Bureau’s narrative.
While this very visual, politically tinged battle was being waged
over social media, EPA continued collecting traditional written com-
ments via Regulations.gov. Thus, the comment period during the
clean water rulemaking played out in two parallel universes: one
highly textual and legalistic in which EPA was silent, and the other a
much more dialogic and political universe in which EPA had an
ongoing voice. The second universe—the visual, social universe—ena-
bled EPA to market its own political narrative directly to the
American people.
In short, within the last few years, adventurous agencies like
DOL and EPA have begun leveraging visual communication tools to
push their narratives about regulatory actions out into the court of
public opinion, and to counter the narratives being spun by other
stakeholders. These efforts, which splash visual information about the
regulatory world across smartphones and tablet computers, aim to
educate and persuade American citizens about the value of agency
actions.
2. Inflow
In contrast to their embrace of outflow-oriented visuals, agencies
have been much less adept at—or perhaps much less interested in—
leveraging visuals as a means of inviting what we call informational
“inflow”—meaning the flow of information from the public to agen-
cies in rulemakings. As we use the term, inflow encompasses both
agencies’ use of images to request and encourage public comment as
well as the public’s sending of image-based information to agencies.
Notably, agencies’ requests for informational inflow often
represent little more than an afterthought appended to an otherwise
outflow-oriented visual.146 Consider, for instance, a whiteboard video
144 See, e.g., U.S. EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2014), https://
twitter.com/EPAwater/status/510098078398152704 [https://perma.cc/8XWL-AL9M]
(posting #ditchthemyth infographic about agricultural exemptions); U.S. EPA Water
(@EPAwater), TWITTER (July 24, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/status/
492306785538412544/photo/1 [https://perma.cc/P7FS-N9CE] (posting #ditchthemyth
infographic disclaiming the regulation of puddles).
145 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Waters of the U.S.: Adjacent Waters and
Floodplains Explained , YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=snrq6cbayS0 (explaining “adjacent waters” and “floodplains”); U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Waters of the U.S.: Ordinary High Water Mark & Tributaries Explained,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htpiTnAYy-I (explaining
concept of “Ordinary High Water Mark”).
146 See, e.g., Mark Rosekind, Strengthening NHTSA’s 5-Star Safety Ratings for the
Future, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/fastlane/strengthening-
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that EPA posted online to explain its proposed Clean Water Rule to
the public.147 The video depicts EPA Deputy Chief of Staff Arvin
Ganesen using colorful drawings on a whiteboard to explain why
EPA’s proposed Clean Water Rule “is so important.”148 Only toward
the very end of the nearly three-minute video does Mr. Ganesen make
a nod toward inviting public comments, stating: “We are starting a
national conversation on this, and we encourage you to tell us what
you think of our proposal and make your voices heard.”149 The video
does not show viewers how they can officially make their voices
heard—other than to briefly flash the web address for EPA’s Clean
Water Rule across the bottom of the video. Nor does the video ever
tell viewers—as EPA’s textual NPRM expressly does—that comments
may be filed in only four ways: via Regulations.gov, via email, by hand
delivery, or via snail mail.150
Similarly, FCC also has failed to facilitate public feedback by
integrating the visual world with the official textual rulemaking
record. The agency states on its website that it welcomes citizens’
thoughts, ideas, and feedback in “many forms—text, photos, and
videos” via social media sites.151 But in the same breath, FCC divorces
its willingness to consider such online communications from its actual
rulemaking proceedings, noting that—unless otherwise specified—
commenting via social media platforms (whether textually or visually)
nhtsa-5-star-safety-ratings [https://perma.cc/V8QH-M6JP] (last visited July 9, 2016) (noting
at the bottom of a visual blog post that NHTSA is accepting comments on proposal to
revise five-star safety ratings program); Overtime, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol
.gov/featured/overtime-proposal [https://perma.cc/58SP-5DNS] (last visited July 9, 2016)
(including only small “share your story” button at the bottom of lengthy DOL infographic
on proposed overtime rule); Clean Power Plan Explained, supra note 124 (making only
brief reference to how EPA wants to hear viewers’ thoughts).
147 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA White Board: Clean Water Act Rule Proposal
Explained, supra note 135.
148 Id. at 00:09–00:13.
149 Id. at 02:28–02:35.
150 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (articulating the four ways formal comments may be
filed). Indeed, small text above the “comments” box on YouTube confusingly states that
EPA “accept[s] comments” according to a policy posted to its blog that—upon close
examination—turns out to involve only informal comments posted to blogs and other
Internet sites. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA White Board: Clean Water Act Rule Proposal
Explained, supra note 135; see Comment Policy, THE EPA BLOG, http://blog.epa.gov/blog/
comment-policy/ [https://perma.cc/MUG7-U7H5] (last visited July 9, 2016) (pertaining to
blog and web content etiquette and procedures, but never explicitly discussing users’
ability to post formal comments on proposed rules).
151 Comment Policy, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/general/comment-
policy [https://perma.cc/N4ZY-YA28] (last visited July 9, 2016).
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“is not a substitute for submitting a formal comment in the record of a
specific Commission proceeding.”152
Counterexamples do exist. This tweet from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—the only independent rather
than executive agency153 that is experimenting with any frequency
with visual rulemaking—provides a good example of an agency’s
efforts to direct the public to the official rulemaking process:
CFPB TWEET, “LET US KNOW WHAT YOU THINK,” 2014154
The tweet, which pictures two different prepaid cards, invites
viewers to let CFPB know “what you think,” and it includes a link that
takes viewers directly to a CFPB blog post that clearly states: “If you
want to influence the design of a new prepaid card fee disclosure, let
152 Id.
153 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1084
(C.D. Cal. 2014) (describing CFPB as an “independent agency in the Federal Reserve
System”).
154 Consumerfinance.gov (@CFPB), TWITTER (Nov. 19, 2014, 9:33 AM), https://
twitter.com/CFPB/status/535123637582708736 [https://perma.cc/LC65-QP7G]. Image
available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1435.
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us know what you think. Submit a comment at Regulations.gov.”155
Indeed, the blog post even provides a hyperlink to the relevant docket
page on Regulations.gov,156 enabling citizens to easily find the appro-
priate forum for filing official comments.
In a slightly different vein, CFPB also has used visuals to organize
and interpret feedback received from the public prior to issuing an
NPRM.157 For instance, when CFPB was preparing to propose a new
mortgage disclosure rule, it embarked on a large-scale outreach cam-
paign, launching a web-based initiative called “Know Before You
Owe” that invited consumers to view and to comment on prototype
disclosure forms that the CFPB had posted online.158 Consumers
could click on areas of the prototype disclosure forms that they liked
and disliked, and the Bureau’s information technology team compiled
these “clicks” into heatmaps159:
155 Eric Goldberg, Prepaid Products: New Disclosures to Help You Compare Options,




157 See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, FACEBOOK (June 5, 2015), https://
www.facebook.com/CFPB/photos/a.313840478660349.85715.141576752553390/94840228853
7495/?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/5H98-FNJF?type=image] (“Every story we receive
helps to better inform us as we work with other policymakers to improve student loan
servicing for borrowers.”). See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Public Engagement in
Rulemaking: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s New Approach, 7 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2012) (describing CFPB’s willingness to invite public input).
158 Id. at 7–8.
159 Id. at 8.
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CFPB HEATMAP, 2011160
160 Mortgage Disclosure Is Heating Up, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU: CFPB BLOG
(June 24, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/mortgage-disclosure-is-heating-up/
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Using color-coding, CFPB’s heatmaps depicted which areas of
different prototype disclosure forms received the most attention from
readers.161 Red and white areas indicate lots of clicks; purple and gray
areas indicate the least clicks.162
As these examples demonstrate, agencies are deploying visuals
from time to time in order to facilitate informational inflow. But
overall, agencies have eschewed using visuals in this fashion, prefer-
ring instead to use visuals as a means of pushing information out to
the public and shaping political discourse.
3. Overflow
A third and final way in which agencies are using visuals is to
nudge Congress to take legislative action that would advance the
agencies’ and the President’s political agenda. This form of visual
communication—which we call “overflow” because it spills over the
edges of specific rulemaking proceedings and into the legislative
arena—is notable because it involves agencies using visuals to com-
municate with the public about problems in need of legislative, rather
than mere regulatory, solutions.163 Furthermore, overflow is legally
significant because, as we discuss in Part III, if agencies are not
careful, their overflow could veer in the direction of prohibited lob-
bying activity.164
Various visual campaigns launched by DOL over the past few
years provide perfect examples of overflow. Consider, for instance,
DOL’s 2015 “Batgirl” video, which puts a new spin on a nearly 40-
year-old video clip of Batgirl telling Batman: “I’ve worked for you for
a long time and I’m paid less than Robin. Same job, same employer
means equal pay for men and women.”165
[https://perma.cc/VW7N-B9RQ]. Image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/
1434.
161 See McCoy, supra note 157, at 8 (describing project).
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Tom Perez, #LeadOnLeave Notes from the Road: Seattle, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR: U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BLOG (Apr. 1, 2015), http://blog.dol.gov/2015/04/01/lead-on-
leave-tour-seattle/ [https://perma.cc/CQX8-2GQG?type=image] (blog post from DOL’s
“Lead on Leave” tour); Grow America , U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://
www.transportation.gov/grow-america [https://perma.cc/R9HT-WEH5] (last visited July 9,
2016) (linking to video on DOT’s “Grow America” campaign, which pushed for a six-year
funding bill to increase transportation investment); Paid Leave: It’s Time for America to
#LeadOnLeave, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/paid-leave [https://per
ma.cc/RY5H-YZZP] (last visited July 9, 2016) (posting a video and linking to other visual
resources promoting DOL’s “Lead on Leave” campaign).
164 See infra Section III.B.4 (describing risks associated with overflow communication).
165 It’s Time for #EqualPayNow, DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/equal
pay [https://perma.cc/6WCN-A89G] (last visited July 9, 2016). The Department of Labor
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DOL’S “BATGIRL” VIDEO ADVOCATING FOR EQUAL PAY, 2015166
DOL did not issue this updated “Batgirl” video in the context of
any specific rulemaking proceeding. Rather, following on the heels of
President Obama’s own efforts to push Congress to address the issue
of equal pay,167 DOL distributed the video to call attention to how—
decades after Batgirl originally demanded to be paid the same as
Robin168—the pay gap remains.169
The video does not directly urge viewers to contact Congress—
likely in an effort to skirt various anti-lobbying provisions that we dis-
cuss in Part III.170 Nonetheless, a DOL blog post featuring the Batgirl
video calls out the need for congressional action, stating: “As
President Obama said a few months ago in the State of the Union
Address, ‘Congress still needs to pass a law that makes sure a woman
is paid the same as a man for doing the same work. It’s 2015. It’s
has posted the video on YouTube as well. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Equal Pay for Equal Work,
YOUTUBE, at 00:15 (Apr. 8, 2015), https://youtu.be/zhQah4PT_AI.
166 Id.; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1439.
167 See, e.g., Colleen Curtis, Congress Says No to Equal Pay, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG
(June 5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/05/congress-says-no-equal-pay
[https://perma.cc/5WRA-3SH5] (highlighting Obama’s efforts to push Congress to pass
Paycheck Fairness Act); The White House, GOOGLE+ (June 5, 2012), https://
plus.google.com/+whitehouse/posts/BhrxHRqMGfG [https://perma.cc/ZV6W-4YVA]
(promoting Paycheck Fairness Act).
168 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Batgirl Teaches Batman a Lesson About Equal Pay,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 11, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n00xZ_mKQgk
(recirculating 1974 public service announcement featuring Batgirl).
169 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, GENDER PAY GAP: RECENT TRENDS AND
EXPLANATIONS (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/equal_pay_
issue_brief_final.pdf (documenting the significant pay gap between men and women).
170 See infra Section III.B.4 (discussing anti-lobbying statutes).
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time.’”171 Thus, the context of the video suggests that it forms part of
a broader political push for congressional legislation.172
DOL’s ongoing #RaiseTheWage campaign also falls into the
overflow category. DOL lacks regulatory authority to raise the min-
imum wage for all workers nationwide. Instead, as DOL admits,
“Congress must pass a bill which the President signs into law in order
for the minimum wage to go up.”173 But DOL has not been shy about
speaking out on the issue. Consistent with President Obama’s own
minimum wage campaign,174 DOL has posted an entire page of col-
orful “shareables” to its website that visually advocate for a higher
national minimum wage.175 These shareables draw upon everything
from a humorous image of Grumpy Cat to an emotive photograph of
smiling children:
SHAREABLES FROM DOL’S #RAISETHEWAGE CAMPAIGN176
171 Latifa Lyles, It’s Time for Equal Pay Now, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR BLOG (Apr. 13, 2015), https://blog.dol.gov/2015/04/13/its-time-for-equal-pay-now/
[https://perma.cc/P7CD-4VYL].
172 See, e.g., The White House, TUMBLR, http://tmblr.co/ZW21es1UTYqM_ [https://per
ma.cc/5SV7-X2BQ] (highlighting pay inequality through infographic); The White House
(@WhiteHouse), TWITTER (Feb. 12, 2013, 6:50 PM), https://twitter.com/whitehouse/status/
301523725872922624 [https://perma.cc/Y3A2-USKC] (asking “Congress to declare that
women should earn a living equal to their efforts”).
173 Questions and Answers About the Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://
www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/q-a.htm [https://perma.cc/UN3X-Y6PR] (last visited July 11,
2016).
174 See, e.g., The White House, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/rnIEKmQigI/
[https://perma.cc/PR9V-WTR8] (last visited July 11, 2016) (calling on Congress to raise
minimum wage to $10.10 through an infographic); The White House, TUMBLR, http://
tmblr.co/ZW21es1SrHoB0 (explaining, in a video, why President Obama wants Congress
to raise the minimum wage to $10.10).
175 See Shareables, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/minimum-wage/
infographics [https://perma.cc/K64F-TKU2] (last visited July 11, 2016) (posting visual
shareables that advocate for raising the minimum wage).
176 Id.; images available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1463.
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These visuals demonstrate how agencies are leveraging visual
communications even beyond the rulemaking realm, advocating for
legislative solutions to problems that fall outside the confines of their
delegated authority.
B. The President
Like agencies, President Obama has frequently turned to the
power of visuals to control and shape the regulatory state. Notably,
Obama—the “first president of the social media age”177—entered the
White House in 2009, just two years after Apple launched its first
iPhone and right on the heels of the rise of social media.178 Whereas
prior presidents had to rely on the mainstream media to spread their
preferred visuals,179 Obama has been able to speak directly to the
American people through visual communications that his administra-
tion posts online.180  Specifically, in the regulatory realm, Obama has
relied on visuals in two primary ways.  First, he has used visuals to
publicly support rulemaking activity, either by directing the initiation
and substance of rulemaking proceedings or by publicly throwing his
political capital behind proposed rules.  Second, Obama has deployed
visuals as a tool for claiming credit for agency rulemakings, projecting
the sense that executive agencies are simply an extension of his own
policies and goals in a way that no other president has.181
1. Visual Direction & Support of Proposed Rules
One way in which Obama has leveraged the power of visual com-
munications is by deploying visuals to publicly signal his support for
regulatory action, either by directing the initiation and substance of
177 Juliet Eilperin, Here’s How the First President of the Social Media Age Has Chosen to
Connect with Americans, WASH. POST (May 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/politics/wp/2015/05/26/heres-how-the-first-president-of-the-social-media-age-has-
chosen-to-connect-with-americans/.
178 See Porter, supra note 24, at 1718–19 (describing the rapid rise in use of social media
during the relevant time period).
179 Cf. Drake Martinet, Egypt, Al Gore and the .XXX Domain—Bill Clinton Keynotes
ICANN in San Francisco, ALL THINGS DIGITAL (Mar. 17, 2011), http://allthingsd.com/
20110317/egypt-al-gore-and-the-xxx-domain-bill-clinton-keynotes-icann-in-san-francisco/
(noting Clinton’s comment that he became President at the “dawn of the Internet age,”
entering the presidency at a time when only 50 websites existed).
180 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE: BLOG, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog [https://
perma.cc/DA7H-JCHP] (last visited July 11, 2016); The White House, TUMBLR, http://
whitehouse.tumblr.com/ [https://perma.cc/C2XP-WQY4] (last visited July 11, 2016)
(documenting “[t]hings going around the White House that we just had to share with
you”).
181 See Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683,
703–04 (2016) (describing Obama’s extensive use of online media to control the regulatory
state).
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rulemakings or by throwing his political capital behind proposed rules
while a rulemaking is ongoing.  To the extent that these sorts of visuals
are aimed at projecting to the public information about the
President’s involvement in and support for regulatory action, these
visuals can be thought of as the President’s own kind of visual
“outflow.”182
This use of visuals can be seen in a variety of high-stakes
rulemakings, including DOL’s fiduciary duty rule,183 DOL’s overtime
rule,184 and EPA’s and DOT’s fuel efficiency standards.185 Perhaps the
best example, however, can be seen in visuals he deployed to prompt
regulatory efforts to tackle college affordability and student debt in
our nation.186 In June 2014, Obama signed a memorandum directing
the Department of Education (DOE) to propose regulations involving
student debt.187 Simultaneously, the White House issued a steady
stream of visual communications designed to spread the President’s
message of regulatory action. These visuals included a photo posted to
the White House blog of Obama signing the memorandum while
flanked by student borrowers,188 as well as an image of a school
182 See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing agencies’ use of outflow-oriented visuals).
183 See The President’s Weekly Address, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 28,
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/28/weekly-address-ensuring-
hardworking-americans-retire-dignity [https://perma.cc/NWS7-SNNS] (calling on DOL “to
update the rules and to require that retirement advisers put the best interests of their
clients above their own financial interests”); see also Valerie Jarrett, “Conflicts of Interest”
Could Be Eroding Your Savings. Here’s How We’re Fixing It., LINKEDIN (Feb. 23, 2015),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/conflicts-interest-could-eroding-your-savings-heres-how-
jarrett (providing a video promoting the fiduciary rule).
184 See The President’s Weekly Address, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Mar. 15,
2014), https://youtu.be/HGqFQxEtX5k?list=UUYxRlFDqcWM4y7FfpiAN3KQ (showing
Obama explaining that he directed DOL to update its overtime rules).
185 See The White House, FACEBOOK (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.facebook.com/
WhiteHouse/photos/a.158628314237.115142.63811549237/10152290509134238/
?type=3&theater (explaining through an infographic how Obama directed the formulation
of new fuel efficiency standards for large trucks); see also infra Section III.A.1 (discussing
additional examples of Obama’s visual direction of regulatory action).
186 See generally Making College Affordable, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.white
house.gov/issues/education/higher-education/making-college-affordable [https://perma.cc/
WT3T-WYLC] (last visited July 11, 2016) (introducing Obama’s stance on higher
education funding and providing infographics for advocates to share on social media
platforms).
187 See Presidential Memorandum on Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan
Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 3 C.F.R. 359 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/06/09/presidential-memorandum-federal-student-loan-repayments [https://
perma.cc/HPS6-UAAW] (directing the Secretary of Education to “propose regulations that
will allow” certain students to cap their federal student loan payments at 10 percent of
their income); see also Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, supra note 181, at 704
(discussing Obama’s memo on student loan repayments).
188 See David Hudson, President Obama on Student Loan Debt: “No Hardworking
Young Person Should Be Priced Out of a Higher Education,” WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (June
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notebook posted to Instagram that highlighted key points of Obama’s
plan:189
VISUALS ACCOMPANYING OBAMA’S DIRECTIVE TO DOE
REGARDING STUDENT DEBT, 2014190
The White House also posted a video to its blog and to YouTube
in which Obama spoke passionately about his personal student debt
experiences, noting that he and his wife Michelle Obama had finished
paying off their own student loans “just 10 years ago.”191 The next
day, Obama sat down in the White House for his first-ever Tumblr
Q&A, which focused on his student debt memorandum.192 In
explaining the impetus behind the Tumblr session, the President
stated that his administration was “constantly looking for new ways to
reach audiences that are relevant to the things we are talking about,”
and one-third of Americans who applied for student loans in 2014
were Tumblr users.193  All of these visuals enabled Obama to push to
9, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/06/09/president-obama-student-loan-debt-
no-hardworking-young-person-should-be-priced-out-h; see also  The White House,
INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/pCvCwBQisI/ [https://perma.cc/9DHV-Y768]
(last visited July 9, 2016).
189 The White House, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/pCBHrSQisT/ [https://
perma.cc/F4KD-JWUZ] (last visited July 11, 2016) (on left); The White House,
INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/pCvCwBQisI/ (on right).
190 Id.; see also Hudson, supra note 188. Images available at http://www.nyulawreview
.org/media/1477.
191 The White House, President Obama Speaks on Student Loan Debt, YOUTUBE, at
6:58 (June 9, 2014), https://youtu.be/Mz5prW9iw14; see also Hudson, supra note 188
(reporting on the talk in question).
192 The White House, TUMBLR (June 11, 2014), http://tmblr.co/ZW21es1IRxl6a [https://
perma.cc/MV24-8X58]; see also The White House, Behind the Scenes at the First-Ever
White House Q&A, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2014), https://youtu.be/M6soSKgW-MI (video
featuring Tumblr founder David Karp describing his White House Q&A with President
Obama); Tumblr Staff, TUMBLR (June 10, 2014), http://staff.tumblr.com/post/88403429765/
whitehouse-so-this-just-happened [https://perma.cc/RRV4-PL8P].
193 The White House, Behind the Scenes, supra note 192, at 00:22–00:30.
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the public images of his involvement in prompting DOE to address
the issue of student debt.  Ultimately, DOE listened, and it finalized a
rule on the subject as a result of the President’s prompting and his
support.194
2. Visual Ownership of Final Rules
A second way in which President Obama uses visuals is as a
mechanism for claiming credit for and asserting ownership over final
rules.195 One prominent illustration of this can be found in a visual
“memo to America”—today’s version of the fireside chat—that
Obama issued just one day before EPA announced its final version of
the Clean Power Plan196:
OBAMA’S MEMO TO AMERICA ON CLEAN POWER PLAN, 2015197
194 See Student Assistance General Provisions, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,204 (Oct. 13, 2015)
(amending the regulations “to create a new income-contingent repayment plan in
accordance with the President’s initiative to allow more Direct Loan borrowers to cap their
loan payments at 10 percent of their monthly incomes”).
195 See, e.g., The White House, FACEBOOK (June 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/M8WA-
AT3M  (photograph accompanied by text announcing “Obama’s Clean Power Plant
Standards”); The White House, FACEBOOK (May 27, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/
WhiteHouse/photos/pb.63811549237.-2207520000.1454621534./10153484702829238/
?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/KY3B-NFNL?type=image] (“Big news: President
Obama is restoring protections for the streams and wetlands that provide drinking water
for 117 million Americans.”); The White House (@WhiteHouse), TWITTER (May 17, 2016,
5:49 PM), https://twitter.com/whitehouse/status/732734934901764100 (touting that
“@POTUS is taking action” to make millions more workers eligible for overtime pay).
196 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60); Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants [https://
perma.cc/Z4X6-BYBC] (last visited July 9, 2016) (noting that EPA announced its final
Clean Power Plan on August 3, 2015).
197 Memo to America, supra note 16. Image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/
media/1456.
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In it, Obama uses various images accompanied by music and his
own voice to illustrate why his “administration” is releasing what he
calls “the biggest, most important step we’ve ever taken to combat
climate change.”198 Notably, the video does not mention that the
Clean Power Plan was the product of a long and highly technical
agency rulemaking process led by EPA.199 Indeed, Obama does not
mention EPA at all. Instead, he speaks in general terms about his
“administration” taking action, using the video to claim political con-
trol over and ownership of the Clean Power Plan.200
Another example can be found in the following image, which was
published on the White House blog the same day that EPA and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) finalized their Clean
Water Rule201:
#CLEANWATERRULES IMAGE ON WHITE HOUSE BLOG, 2015202
198 Memo to America, supra note 16, at 00:56–01:05.
199 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663 (noting the “unprecedented outreach and
engagement with states, tribes, utilities, and other stakeholders” that led to promulgation
of the final rule).
200 Id.
201 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified in scattered parts of 33 C.F.R. and 40 C.F.R.).
202 Gina McCarthy & Jo-Ellen Darcy, Reasons We Need the Clean Water Rule, WHITE
HOUSE: BLOG (May 27, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/27/reasons-we-
need-clean-water-rule [https://perma.cc/BC8T-22N6]. Image available at http://
www.nyulawreview.org/media/1436.
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Although the text of the blog post itself (which was cross-posted
on EPA’s own blog)203 expressly notes that EPA and the Corps
promulgated the Clean Water Rule, this image posted to the White
House blog trumpeted in all caps that “PRESIDENT OBAMA” was
restoring protections for streams and wetlands.204 Thus, the image
made the “news” look and sound like it was the result of a political
victory championed by the President rather than the result of a tech-
nocratic, expert-driven rulemaking process run by agencies.
C. Stakeholders Outside of the Executive Branch
Agencies and the President are not the only parties leveraging
the power of visual communications to shape and control regulatory
action today. Rulemaking stakeholders outside the executive
branch—including industry insiders, members of Congress, the media,
and everyday Americans—also are using visuals in the regulatory
sphere, creating a newly visual public dialogue about agency
rulemaking. They are doing so in three primary ways. First, they are
deploying visuals as a means of shaping agencies’ regulatory agendas,
seeking to prompt agencies to initiate rulemakings on specific sub-
jects.  Second, they are using visuals during the comment period on
proposed rules. Third, after final rules are promulgated by agencies,
interested parties are using visuals as a means of supporting or
attacking the recently promulgated rules.
1. Visual Agenda Shaping
At the front end of the rulemaking process, outside parties are
using visuals as agenda-shaping tools, seeking to prod agencies to
write rules addressing specific problems.205 One very emotionally
powerful example of this can be found on a website created by the
Karth family from North Carolina. The family lost their two young
girls, Mary and AnnaLeah, when the car they were riding in was hit by
203 Gina McCarthy & Jo-Ellen Darcy, Reasons We Need the Clean Water Rule, EPA
BLOG: EPA CONNECT (May 27, 2015), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2015/05/reasons-we-need-
the-clean-water-rule/.
204 McCarthy & Darcy, supra note 202.
205 See, e.g., Low Power FM Advocacy Grp., LPFM Petition for Rulemaking, YOUTUBE
(July 27, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=miFPhODpS3M (video by Low Power
FM Advocacy Group seeking support for rulemaking petition it filed with FCC); Tell the
CFPB: Stand up for American Families!, NAT’L PEOPLE’S ACTION, http://action.npa-us.org/
page/s/cfpb-stand-up-for-american-families [https://perma.cc/J655-9SRB] (last visited July
11, 2016) (web post including a photo of a shark that urges CFPB to “write strong
consumer lending rules”).
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a truck and forced underneath a second truck’s rear trailer.206 The
Karth family’s website features photographs of the girls before they
died, videos telling the family’s tragic story, and a photograph of the
crash scene, which graphically demonstrates how the car carrying the
girls was quite literally crushed underneath the back end of a truck.207
PHOTOS OF MARY AND ANNALEAH KARTH AND THE SCENE OF
THEIR DEATH208
The Karths’ website is much more than a memorial. It is a call to
action. Among other things, the Karth family has used their website to
push the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
to initiate a rulemaking to require trucks to use rear guards that would
prevent cars from riding under trucks in the event of a collision.209
Not surprisingly, the family’s story has resonated with others, and in
response to Ms. Karth’s petition, NHTSA launched a rulemaking pro-
ceeding that proposes to enhance truck underride protections.210
Thus, the Karth family’s website and the very emotional images that
are posted there illustrate how ordinary citizens can and do use visuals
in powerful ways to bring attention to problems in need of regulatory
solutions.
206 See About, ANNALEAH & MARY, http://annaleahmary.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/
CG95-KEFV] (last visited July 11, 2016) (describing the accident that killed the two girls).
207 Id.
208 Id.; images available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1492.
209 See Avoid an Impasse: Follow-up Underride Roundtable with Negotiated Rulemaking
Meeting, ANNALEAH & MARY (May 21, 2016) http://annaleahmary.com/2016/05/avoid-an-
impasse-follow-up-underride-roundtable-with-negotiated-rulemaking-meeting/#comment-
35113 (discussing efforts to engage in negotiated rulemaking).
210 See Rear Impact Guards, Rear Impact Protection, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,418, 78,418
(proposed Dec. 16, 2015) (“NHTSA is issuing this NPRM in response to a petition for
rulemaking from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), and from Ms.
Marianne Karth and the Truck Safety Coalition (TSC).”).
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2. Visual Comments
Parties outside the executive branch also use images to provide or
to prompt comments on proposed rules. Sometimes this occurs as part
of the official commenting process when interested members of the
public attach or incorporate visuals into their otherwise traditional
textual comments.211 Much more often, however, parties outside of
the executive branch use visuals to raise public awareness during the
comment period.
Members of Congress, for example, frequently circulate videos
and other visuals that respond to proposed agency rules and that
encourage members of the public to register comments on proposed
rules.212 Sometimes these visuals specifically direct constituents to the
official rulemaking process, urging them to file comments in the
rulemaking docket.213 At other times, members of Congress simply
encourage constituents to register their views using unofficial social
media channels. A tweet from Senator Ted Cruz, which shows his
opposition to a proposed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule
involving tax-exempt social welfare organizations, falls into the latter
category:
211 See, e.g., Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Comment Letter on NHTSA Rule
Regarding Rear Impact Protection, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated
Equipment, Single Unit Trucks (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=NHTSA-2015-0070-0032 [https://perma.cc/6XBT-88N9] (filing comment that
includes images in NHTSA rulemaking); Marianne Karth, Comment Letter on NHTSA
Rule Regarding Rear Impact Protection, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated
Equipment, Single Unit Trucks (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=NHTSA-2015-0070-0018 [https://perma.cc/TJ92-HUG3] (same); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Comment Letter on Preliminary Effluent Guidelines Program
Plan for 2004/2005 (Apr. 15, 2004), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-
OW-2003-0074-0748 [https://perma.cc/62AB-FQU6] (filing comment in EPA rulemaking
docket that includes visuals).
212 See, e.g., Lisa Murkowski, Alaska Grocery Prices, FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/
photos/senatorlisamurkowski/sets/72157630782007502# [https://perma.cc/4QQG-YYTY]
(last updated July 29, 2012) (displaying constituent-submitted photos of groceries with high
prices in Alaska); Senator Pat Toomey, Pushing Back on Out-of-Control EPA Regulations,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VX-wiMGUEg (responding
to EPA’s proposed Clean Water Rule); Ron Wyden, Wyden: Speak up for Net Neutrality,
YOUTUBE (July 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=khhBDQjsZT4 (responding
to FCC’s net neutrality proposal).
213 See, e.g., Senator Chuck Grassley, Supporting the Renewable Fuel Standard,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_r_oLk5e7dI (encouraging
Iowans to weigh in and file comments with EPA on its proposed renewable fuel standard).
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TWEET FROM SENATOR TED CRUZ, 2014214
Senator Cruz’s visual plea was not designed to prompt constitu-
ents to file official comments during the public comment period,
214 Ted Cruz (@tedcruz), TWITTER (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:16 PM), https://twitter.com/tedcruz/
status/435870573051121664 [https://perma.cc/U6LC-ND2Y]. Image available at http://
www.nyulawreview.org/media/1474.
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which had already closed.215 Rather, his tweet linked to a page that
expressly called upon viewers to “[s]pread the word about this pro-
posed rule change with your Facebook friends and Twitter
followers.”216
In addition to members of Congress, the media uses visuals to put
a spotlight on proposed regulations and to encourage public com-
ments on the rules. No better example of this exists than John Oliver’s
late-night comedy spot on FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking, which not
only called upon viewers to speak up but also actually gave them the
web address for the agency’s official commenting platform.217 As we
noted above, this proved tremendously effective, ultimately
prompting 45,000 new comments to flood into FCC’s comment
system.218
Interest groups also have leveraged visuals in order to exhort
their members and others to support or to oppose various proposed
rules.219 Sometimes these visuals expressly point viewers to the official
rulemaking process, calling out the deadline for filing comments and
providing viewers with the relevant Regulations.gov web address or
the relevant rulemaking docket number in order to help facilitate the
filing of official comments. Various videos circulated in response to
the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) recent rulemaking
involving drones, for instance, not only provided details about how to
215 See Stop the IRS’s Abuse of Power, U.S. SENATOR FOR TEX. TED CRUZ, http://
www.cruz.senate.gov/irs/ [https://perma.cc/YUY6-SN2F] (last visited July 11, 2016) (“The
IRS was required to accept and publish comments from the public—and over 140,000 of
you did. The public commenting period may have ended, but you can still make your voice
heard.”); see also Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-
Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013) (noting that
comment period would run through January 28, 2014).
216 Id.
217 John Oliver: Net Neutrality, supra note 1, at 11:07.
218 Brody, supra note 8.
219 See, e.g., EPA: Protect Us from Toxic Air, EARTH DAY NETWORK, http://
action.earthday.net/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=7023 [https://perma.cc/QLQ7-
TMG5] (last visited July 11, 2016) (reproducing a photo of factory spewing out pollution
accompanied by call to comment on proposed EPA rule involving mercury and air toxics);
Healthcare Professionals’ Perspectives: FDA Proposed Rule on Generic Drug Labeling,
GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/GPhA5886_infographic_
v5_a_.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PTC-5R9F] (last visited July 11, 2016) (presenting infographic
in opposition to proposed FDA rule on generic drugs); Talking Points for the EPA Power
Plant Rules Public Hearings, STOP THE FRACK ATTACK (July 28, 2014) http://
www.stopthefrackattack.org/talking-points-for-the-epa-power-plant-rules-public-hearings/
[https://perma.cc/JN26-8MMU] (last visited July 11, 2016) (featuring picture of Cookie
Monster opposing proposed EPA rule).
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file official comments but also called out when the comment period
would close.220
At other times, visuals circulated by interested members of the
public seem designed primarily to drum up unofficial, political dia-
logue in the court of public opinion using modern online tools such as
Twitter hashtags and Storify boards.221 A group of consumer advo-
cates, for example, created a Storify board in March 2015 at the same
time that the CFPB announced it was considering proposing “payday
lending” rulemaking222—a rulemaking aimed at stopping predatory
payday loans.223 The consumer group’s Storify board features images
of everyday Americans across the country holding up rudimentary
paper signs such as this one bearing the hashtag #StopTheDebtTrap:
IMAGE FROM STORIFY URGING CFPB TO ADDRESS
PAYDAY LENDING, 2015224
220 See, e.g., Acad. of Model Aeronautics, FAA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) COMMENT NOW!, YOUTUBE (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=UwPGfbtOk-E&app=desktop (encouraging comments on proposed drone rules); Victor
Villegas, You Need to Comment on the #NPRM, YOUTUBE (Mar. 6, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cyr8oNhNZlo&app=desktop (featuring a music parody set to
tune of the famous YMCA song designed to encourage comments on proposed drone
rules).
221 Storify is a social media tool that lets users gather information from Facebook,
Twitter, and other social media resources into one place, in order to tell a story about a
particular event, issue, or topic. See Liz Dexter, What Is Storify and How Do I Use It?,
LIBROEDITING  (Nov. 27, 2013), https://libroediting.com/2013/11/27/what-is-storify-and-
how-do-i-use-it/; see also https://storify.com/browse (demonstrating uses of Storify).
222 Factsheet: The CFPB Considers Proposal to End Payday Debt Trap, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 26, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-proposal-
under-consideration.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X5L-3ZUZ].
223 See StopTheDebtTrap, Tell the CFPB to #StopTheDebtTrap, STORIFY, https://
storify.com/EndTheDebtTrap/tell-cordray-at-the-cfpb-to-stop-predatory-lending [https://
perma.cc/7FR5-7Y55] (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
224 Id.; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1453. See also Faith &
Payday Lending Toolkit: Resources for Learning & Action, PICO NAT’L NETWORK, http://
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This kind of simple visual campaign can democratize and open up
the rulemaking process.  It does this by providing citizens with an
accessible, social forum for publicly voicing their views—one that
takes away some of the home court advantage that industry insiders
and their lawyers have long enjoyed while operating in the traditional,
densely textual rulemaking forum.
Another highly effective example of this social dialogue can be
found in the American Farm Bureau’s #DitchTheRule campaign,225
which involved a full-scale assault on EPA’s proposed Clean Water
Rule.226 A central visual in the Farm Bureau’s anti-EPA campaign was
a video parody set to the musical score “Let It Go” from the movie
Frozen.227 In the video, as a mother sings, her children—wearing
swimsuits and goggles—pretend to canoe, fish, and swim in dry
ditches on their farm:
#DITCHTHERULE VIDEO PARODY, 2014228
www.piconetwork.org/community-tools/payday-lending-toolkit (last visited June 10, 2016)
(providing resources for faith communities to educate members about debt traps and to
inspire members to contact the CFPB with their payday lending stories).
225 See, e.g., Dave Lucas, Farmers Fight EPA over Proposed Water Rule, WAMC (June
19, 2014), http://wamc.org/post/farmers-fight-epa-over-proposed-water-rule#stream/0
(including a #DitchTheRule image from the Farm Bureau); Neb. Farm Bureau, Waters of
the U.S. Rule Explained, YOUTUBE (June 30, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=SFe9u2696gg&app=desktop.
226 See It’s Time to Ditch the Rule, AM. FARM BUREAU, https://perma.cc/RJ96-LFVB?
type=image (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (attacking the EPA’s Waters of the United States
rule).
227 Mo. Farm Bureau, That’s Enough—(“Let It Go” Parody), YOUTUBE (May 23, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0OqJqNbbs.
228 Id.; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1438.
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The video has more than 140,000 views,229 and the family was
interviewed by Fox News.230 Thus, the Farm Bureau successfully used
the video to call public attention to their opposition to EPA’s pro-
posed rule.
3. Visual Advocacy for and Against Final Rules
Parties outside the executive branch have even relied upon
visuals to advocate for or against rules after they have been promul-
gated. These visuals often relate to rules that have come under attack
after their promulgation (sometimes in judicial proceedings and some-
times in Congress). Many examples can be found in the wake of
EPA’s promulgation of the Clean Power Plan,231 as well as EPA’s and
the Corp’s promulgation of the Clean Water Rule.232 For example,
Earthjustice posted this tweet in support of the Clean Power Plan
after a lower federal court refused to stay the rule:
229 Mo. Farm Bureau, supra note 227.
230 WATCH: Frustrated Farmers Parody “Let It Go” to Protest EPA Regulations, FOX
NEWS INSIDER (June 9, 2014), http://insider.foxnews.com/2014/06/09/video-frustrated-
farmers-parody-let-it-go-protest-epa-regulations.
231 See, e.g., Earthjustice (@Earthjustice), TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2016) https://twitter.com/
Earthjustice/status/690307987596935168 [https://perma.cc/CTJ6-9RKS] (photo of solar
panels used to celebrate lower court’s refusal to block Clean Power Plan).
232 See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau (@FarmBureau), TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2015), https://
twitter.com/FarmBureau/status/661551113548730368 [https://perma.cc/SGQ9-8U7R]
(featuring photo of ditch and urging legislative repeal of EPA’s rule); John Hoeven
(@senjohnhoeven), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2016), https://twitter.com/senjohnhoeven/status/
690663376968638464 (tweeting image from highlighting Senator Hoeven’s attempts to
repeal EPA’s Clean Water Rule); Steve Scalise (@SteveScalise), TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://twitter.com/SteveScalise/status/687316192378228736 (calling, in his capacity as a
Representative, for repeal of the Clean Water Rule); T&I Comm. (@Transport), TWITTER
(Jan. 13, 2016), https://twitter.com/Transport/status/687333707515039748 [https://perma.cc/
3RRW-ERJB] (featuring a photo of agricultural ditches and calling EPA’s rule “flawed”).
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EARTHJUSTICE TWEET SUPPORTING EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN,
2015233
Although Earthjustice’s celebration proved to be short-lived,234
this visual nonetheless demonstrates how parties do not stop their
visual communications once high-profile rules are enacted. To the
contrary, visual communications aimed at the court of public opinion
can continue to fly in the online sphere long after rules are finalized,
even as judicial battles are waged in the federal courts.
III
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF RULEMAKING
As we have demonstrated, rulemaking is no longer a solely tex-
tual affair. To the contrary, executive agencies, the President,
Congress, repeat-player institutions, and everyday Americans are
turning to the tools of today’s visual information age to push their
agendas in the context of agency rulemakings. This emergence of
visual communications in the rulemaking realm over the past few
years has occurred largely outside of the four corners of the law, cre-
ating what might appear to be two very different rulemaking uni-
verses: one highly textual and legalistic, and a second that takes a
much more political and visual shape. Yet the reality is that these two
universes are not all that distinct. Visuals are reshaping the
rulemaking landscape.
233 Earthjustice (@Earthjustice), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2016), https://twitter.com/
Earthjustice/status/690579759428796416 [https://perma.cc/LJR9-TFNN]. Image available at
http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1441.
234 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted a stay of the Clean Power Plan.
Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999, 999 (2016) (mem.).
1232 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1183
Likely due to the legal profession’s preoccupation with text,235
administrative law scholars have failed to notice the emergence of
visual communications, and little attention has been given to the legal
implications of this emerging phenomenon. This Part fills that gap,
identifying and analyzing a variety of theoretical and doctrinal impli-
cations that we believe flow from the rising prominence of visual
rulemaking. Ultimately, we conclude that the benefits of visual
rulemaking outweigh its risks and that administrative law doctrine and
theory can and should welcome the use of visuals in rulemaking.
A. Theoretical Implications
Congress routinely transfers legislative-like power to agencies,
enabling agencies to write legally binding regulations that touch on
everything from the quality of the air we breathe to the safety of the
food we eat.236 Despite longstanding objections to this massive power
transfer,237 the reality is that administrative law today habitually toler-
ates—indeed, often welcomes—Congress’s delegation of rulemaking
powers to agencies.238 It has done this by relying upon a variety of
theoretical justifications, including notions of: (1) political accounta-
bility; (2) expertise; and (3) public deliberation.239 As we discuss
below, the emergence of a visual rulemaking world has important
implications for each of these three central theoretical justifications
underpinning the modern regulatory state.
235 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
236 See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1005 (2015)
(noting that agency “rules look and feel much like congressionally enacted statutes,
providing binding legal norms that govern nearly everything ranging from the quality of
the air we breathe to the safety of the products we buy”).
237 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 155–64 (1993) (arguing that delegation to
administrative agencies is unconstitutional); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 379–80 (2002) (presenting examples of statutes that the
author argues violate the nondelegation principle as the author defines it).
238 See Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, supra note 236, at 1013 (noting that the non-
delegation doctrine does little to constrain Congress’s delegation of legislative-like power
to agencies).
239 See Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of
Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 423 (2012) (observing that courts
condone power transfers to agencies based on considerations of agency expertise,
accountability, and accessibility); cf. Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using
Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) (“[A]dministrative law’s
primary purpose has been to develop various legal structures and mechanisms—such as
political oversight, judicial review, public participation, and reason-giving requirements—
that help to legitimate and control agency action.”).
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1. Political Accountability
One major theoretical justification frequently offered in support
of allowing Congress to delegate large swaths of legislative-like power
to agencies involves notions of political accountability.240 The justifi-
cation goes as follows: Agency officials who write legally binding rules
are not elected by the people and thus are not directly politically
accountable.241 Yet, “the Chief Executive is,”242 and so agencies can
be said to be indirectly politically accountable to the extent that “the
President is accountable for the actions of agencies.”243 Courts fre-
quently invoke this notion of political accountability to support the
legitimacy of today’s regulatory state.244 Indeed, this political account-
ability rationale is part of the fabric of a variety of foundational
administrative law doctrines, including Chevron deference245 and judi-
cial acceptance of ex parte communications in informal rulemaking
proceedings.246
Outside the judiciary, scholars too have widely embraced the
notion that presidential control over agency rulemaking helps legiti-
mize regulatory activity by providing a mechanism for electoral
accountability.247 As one scholar has put it, “[w]e vote for presidents,
not secretaries or administrators,” and so “White House oversight
240 See Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics, supra note 73, at 35 (identifying political
accountability as a newer justification for agency action, as policymaking decisions are
“highly political decisions that should be made by politically accountable institutions”); see
also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1763 (2007) (describing the transition in the 1980s in administrative doctrine
and theory to presidential control of agency action). See generally Pardo & Watts, supra
note 239, at 432 (noting that political accountability is a “reason frequently given for
allowing administrative agencies to engage in policymaking”).
241 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(noting that “agencies are not directly accountable to the people”); see also CORNELIUS M.
KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 167 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that “rulemaking has a fundamental
flaw that violates basic democratic principles” because “[t]hose who write the law
embodied in rules are not elected”).
242 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
243 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 114 (5th ed.
2010).
244 See id. § 2.6, at 113 (noting that the Supreme Court has invoked political
accountability to support the “legitimacy of the administrative state”).
245 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (embracing the political accountability rationale).
246 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting the notion
that “Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking into a rarified
technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential
power”).
247 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 240, at 1764 (describing how the presidential control
model enjoys “broad scholarly appeal” and “widespread support”); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–39 (2001) (asserting that
presidential control promotes political accountability and transparency).
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places accountability precisely where it should be, namely, where the
electorate can do something about it.”248
Notably, this reliance on political accountability rests on a big but
often unstated assumption: that the electorate will indeed know about
the existence of regulatory action and will know who to blame—or
who to credit—for regulatory action or inaction. That, however, is not
often the case. Indeed, agencies routinely fill their NPRMs and the
statements of basis and purpose that accompany their final rules with
technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, stripping the
rulemaking record of any references to political influences.249 Political
influences, in other words, have historically been swept “under the
rug” and omitted from agencies’ rulemaking records.250 The result is
that political influences are rarely subjected to scrutiny by the courts
or by the public. Nor does the public normally have much insight into
the President’s significant involvement in directing the regulatory
state.
This lack of transparency has serious consequences for adminis-
trative law’s heavy reliance on theories of political control and
accountability.251 For one thing, as Nina Mendelson has noted,
obscuring political influence means that it is “less likely that the elec-
torate will perceive that there is meaningful presidential supervision
of agency decision making.”252 In addition, opacity “reduces the
chance of the electorate understanding the content of that presidential
supervision, further reducing the accountability of the President for
those decisions.”253
It is here, we believe, that the emerging visual rulemaking world
could play a very valuable role. By raising the visibility of agencies’
regulatory activities and the President’s tight control over executive
agencies, visual communications promise to make the regulatory state
more transparent to the American people, enabling greater political
accountability. Even though agencies’ official rulemaking records
continue to speak in technocratic terms with little, if any, acknowl-
248 Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (1987).
249 See Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics, supra note 73, at 23 (“[A]gencies today
generally couch their decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, either
failing to disclose or affirmatively hiding political influences that factor into the mix.”).
250 Id. at 29.
251 Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
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edgement of political influences,254 the new, more visual universe of
agency rulemaking is bringing the political nature of rulemaking out
into the open, putting a bright and very visible spotlight on the
President’s involvement in the regulatory sphere.
Sometimes agencies themselves cast this spotlight. An illustrative
example of this can be seen in DOL’s whiteboard video on its pro-
posed overtime rule.255 The video makes Obama’s role in directing
DOL’s rulemaking crystal clear, providing viewers with an image of
President Obama holding his hand up in the air and telling DOL to
“update the rules”:
DOL’S WHITEBOARD VIDEO ON DOL’S OVERTIME RULE, 2015256
This overt and very visual acknowledgement of Obama’s involve-
ment contrasts with the brief, almost passing mention of Obama that
can be found in the lengthy, textual NPRM.257
Of course, the President himself frequently leverages the power
of visuals to project his control over executive agencies. Consider, for
example, the visuals he issued in the context of DOE’s rulemaking on
student debt, which we already discussed.258 From the very beginning
of that rulemaking, President Obama used visuals in a concerted
manner to make his close involvement in the rulemaking unmistak-
254 See Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics, supra note 73, at 23–29.
255 Shierholz, supra note 18.
256 Id. at 02:22; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1440.
257 See Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 99 (including few references to
President Obama).
258 See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text.
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ably clear to the American people. Likewise, in the context of EPA’s
Clean Power Plan, Obama used visuals to quite literally claim the rule
as his own, referring to it not as “EPA’s Clean Power Plan” but rather
as “President Obama’s Clean Power Plan”:
INFOGRAPHIC FROM WHITE HOUSE ASSERTING OWNERSHIP OVER
CLEAN POWER PLAN, 2015259
In contrast to his overt claim of ownership over EPA’s regulatory
actions, Obama has been careful not to claim ownership over the
actions of independent regulatory commissions, which—unlike execu-
tive agencies—enjoy some insulation due to the President’s inability
to remove the agency heads at will.260 Consider, for instance, Obama’s
use of visuals in the FCC’s net neutrality proceeding. President
Obama was not shy about publicly urging the FCC, an independent
regulatory commission, to adopt a net neutrality plan that was consis-
tent with his own policy preferences.261 Yet both his words and his
visuals projected the notion that the decision was not his to make.
Instead, it belonged to the FCC.262
259 The White House (@WhiteHouse), TWITTER (Mar. 31, 2015), https://twitter.com/
WhiteHouse/status/582923408121442304 [https://perma.cc/287P-3NW4] (explaining in a
visual that the Clean Power Plant Standards would prevent up to 150,000 asthma attacks
each year). Image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1455.
260 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding limits on
President’s ability to remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission, an independent
regulatory commission).
261 See President’s Net Neutrality Video, supra note 9, at 01:23–01:27 (setting forth
Obama’s plan for net neutrality but recognizing that “FCC is an independent agency, and
ultimately this decision is theirs alone”).
262 See id.; Ian Tuttle, ‘Net Neutrality’? No, Thank You, NAT’L REV. ONLINE: THE
CORNER (Nov. 10, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/392462/net-
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Perhaps the best illustration of this can be found in a GIF posted
by the White House to Tumblr after the FCC released its final net
neutrality rule. It depicts Obama thanking the FCC for keeping the
Internet free, and then flashes to images of cascading candy hearts
inscribed with the word “INTERNET.” The GIF, which prominently
features the word “THANKS,” is carefully designed to give credit to
FCC rather than to claim the victory as the President’s own:
TUMBLR GIF DEPICTING OBAMA THANKING THE FCC FOR ITS
NEW NET NEUTRALITY RULE, 2016263
These sorts of visuals quite literally make visible what has histori-
cally been hidden from the sight of everyday Americans: that the
President is carefully involved in directing the activities of executive
agencies like EPA and in influencing (but not quite directing) the
actions of independent agencies like the FCC. Thus, visual communi-
cations—even if they remain technically separate from agencies’ offi-
cial rulemaking records—promise to bring greater transparency and
political accountability to the administrative state. They provide
highly visible support for administrative law’s heavy reliance on theo-
ries of political accountability and presidential control, demonstrating
a connection between theory and reality on the ground.
neutrality-no-thank-you-ian-tuttle (republishing White House infographic in which Obama
urged but did not direct FCC to take action).
263 The White House, TUMBLR (Feb. 26, 2015), http://whitehouse.tumblr.com/post/
112154742628/great-news-the-federal-communications-commission [https://perma.cc/
LF2D-JSV3]. Images available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1496.
1238 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1183
2. Expertise
A second—and somewhat conflicting—justification frequently
offered in support of agency rulemaking turns on notions of agency
expertise.264 Pursuant to this account, Congress’s transfer of
legislative-like powers to agencies makes sense because such delega-
tions enable technically competent, specialized experts to fill in the
details of complex regulatory schemes.265
During the Progressive and the New Deal eras, key founders of
the modern administrative state broadly espoused this notion of
agency expertise.266 However, administrative law today is much more
indecisive about how fully to embrace expertise. In particular, admin-
istrative law regularly veers between, on the one hand, acknowledging
the important role that political control plays in justifying agency
action, and, on the other hand, demanding that agencies act in a tech-
nocratic, expert-driven manner.267 This vacillation is particularly acute
in the judicial review arena, where courts routinely demand that agen-
cies justify their actions in expert-driven terms in order to survive so-
called “arbitrary and capricious” review.268 Yet the courts also recog-
nize—thanks to the Supreme Court’s famous Chevron case—that an
agency can “properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views
of wise policy to inform its judgments” and that courts should defer to
agencies’ reasonable constructions of statutory ambiguity because
agencies, unlike courts, are indirectly accountable to the people via
the President.269
264 See infra notes 265–68 and accompanying text. See generally Pardo & Watts, supra
note 239, at 424 (“One of the main factors supporting congressional delegations of broad
policymaking power to agencies is that agencies possess specialized expertise.”).
265 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 440–41 (1987) (noting that increase in delegations of authority to agencies during
the New Deal was driven in part by a sense that agencies were “technically sophisticated”).
266 See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938)
(describing administrators as “men bred to the facts”); Joseph B. Eastman, The Place of the
Independent Commission, 12 CONST. REV. 95, 101 (1928) (describing agencies as “clearly
nonpartisan in their makeup”).
267 See Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics, supra note 73, at 33–37 (describing
administrative law’s vacillation between politics and expertise).
268 See id. at 15–23 (describing how judiciary’s application of “arbitrary and capricious”
review demands that agencies justify their actions in technocratic, expert-driven terms); see
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (solidifying expert-driven model of agency decision making, requiring evidence-
based decision making documented in rulemaking records); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID
L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 226 (1990) (“[T]he submerged yet
powerful message in the Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm [was] that the political
directions of a particular administration are inadequate to justify regulatory policy.”).
269 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
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Not surprisingly, the visual rulemaking world that we have uncov-
ered reflects—indeed, heightens—this longstanding, simmering ten-
sion between expertise and politics in administrative law. Foremost,
visuals such as those we have described above make clear to everyday
Americans what has always been true but often goes unspoken: There
is no perfectly clean demarcation between expert-driven decisions and
policy-driven decisions.270 Even purportedly fact-driven decisions
often involve value-laden policy judgments about difficult political
questions.271  Consider, for example, a video created by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) relating to
its efforts to amend existing rules for occupational exposure to crystal-
line silica. Just a few weeks before OSHA published its highly tech-
nical, 231-page NPRM in the Federal Register,272 it posted a video
called “Deadly Dust” to YouTube.273 The nine-minute video includes,
among other things, interviews with a white-coated doctor,274 a safety
expert,275 and an official-looking bureaucrat wearing a formal coat
and a tie.276 It also features x-rays that graphically depict the differ-
ence between healthy, clear lungs (on the left) and the scar-filled
lungs of someone suffering from advanced silicosis (on the right):
270 When delegating rulemaking power to agencies, Congress only occasionally tries to
draw a clear line between scientific considerations and policy considerations. See, e.g.,
Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring that
the Secretary of Interior base ESA decisions “solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available” (emphasis added)). Most of the time, Congress says nothing
about what factors may be relevant to an agency’s decision-making process, leaving the
door open to blend of factual as well as policy-laden factors. See Watts, Proposing a Place
for Politics, supra note 73, at 45–52.
271 See Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, supra note 181, at 724 (“When science
and expertise alone cannot answer questions concerning how or when best to regulate,
competing value-laden policy preferences necessarily and inevitably will come into play.”);
see also Kagan, supra note 247, at 2356–57 (arguing that a strong presidential role is
appropriate when agencies “confront the question, which science alone cannot answer, of
how to make determinate judgments regarding the protection of health and safety in the
face both of scientific uncertainty and competing public interests”); Emily Hammond
Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of
Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 744 (2011) (noting that even “good” science often
integrates policy choices).
272 Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,274
(proposed Sept. 12, 2013) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915 & 1926).
273 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 2013 “Deadly Dust” Silica, YOUTUBE (Aug. 23, 2013),
https://youtu.be/eXsGJ1C4Xcw [hereinafter Deadly Dust Video].
274 Id. at 01:35.
275 Id. at 02:37.
276 Id. at 01:52.
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X-RAYS FEATURED IN OSHA’S “DEADLY DUST” VIDEO, 2013277
All of these images demonstrate OSHA’s technical competency
and its knowledge on the issue of silicosis.
At the same time, the video depicts the human impact of this dis-
ease. It includes emotional pictures of various workers who have died
from silicosis and footage of grief-stricken family members talking
about the devastating effects silicosis had on their loved ones. One
segment, for instance, tells the true story of a sandblaster from
Tennessee who died from silicosis. The video shows his widow, who
now works two jobs and can barely make ends meet, taking flowers to
his grave.278 These moving stories shed light on how the silica
rulemaking turns not only on facts and science but also on sensitive
policy questions about the value of human life. The video, accordingly,
serves as an excellent example of how visuals can make more
apparent what agencies’ lengthy rulemaking documents too often
obscure: Rulemaking is not always just about the facts. It often turns
on complex, highly value-laden, and sometimes emotional policy
choices, such as how to protect human life. These policy choices may
be easier for people to understand when they can quite literally visu-
alize them.
Notably, however, there is a risk that visuals will tell only one
side of the story, thus obscuring important facts that do exist. Visuals
are powerful precisely because they simplify and boil down informa-
tion. They encourage quick reactions and they often invite emotional
277 Id. at 02:27; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1478.
278 Deadly Dust Video, supra note 273, at 08:00.
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responses.279 Thus, when deployed in the rulemaking context, visuals
inevitably emphasize some facts and downplay others. Some visuals
might obscure the deep technical complexity that exists in agencies’
lengthy textual notices and final rules. OSHA’s “Deadly Dust”
video,280 for example, does not discuss the costs of the proposed rule.
Nor does it acknowledge that industry has voiced significant opposi-
tion to it based on concerns about cost and feasibility.281 Instead, the
video is one-sided, avoiding the technicalities of its proposed rule in
favor of telling a powerful, emotion-filled story about the human costs
of silicosis.
Similarly, the American Farm Bureau’s #DitchTheRule cam-
paign—and EPA’s corresponding #DitchTheMyth campaign—high-
light how visuals may present matters as “fact” when the reality is
much more nuanced. In its largely visual campaign against EPA’s pro-
posed Clean Water Rule, the American Farm Bureau unleashed a
variety of visuals designed to establish as “fact” various takes on
EPA’s rule that EPA said were “myths.”282 For example, the Farm
Bureau asserted that EPA’s proposed rule would alter the regulatory
landscape for agricultural farms, whereas EPA labeled that assertion a
“myth.”283
279 See supra Section I.A (discussing the power of images).
280 Deadly Dust Video, supra note 273.
281 See Robert Iafolla, Industry Coalesces in Opposition to Silica Proposal, over Costs,
Feasibility, Impacts, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.bna.com/industry-
coalesces-opposition-n17179882099/ (detailing industry comments criticizing OSHA’s rule
for being economically infeasible and relying on incorrect assumptions).
282 Compare Am. Farm Bureau, #DitchTheRule, DITCH THE RULE, https://perma.cc/
K2RN-TM6V (last visited Feb. 26, 2016), with Ditch the Myth, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY,  https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-07/documents/ditch_the_myth_
wotus.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6FQ-YKPT] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (presenting
conflicting information on the impacts of the proposed Waters of the United States rule).
283 Compare Take Action: Tell EPA to #DitchTheRule, MCCLEAN COUNTY FARM
BUREAU, (June 13, 2014), http:// www . mcfb . org / 2014 / 06 / take - action - tell - epa - to -
ditchtherule/ [https://perma.cc/R593-X7P7] (showing image of agricultural farms with a call
to “ditch the rule”), with Ditch the Myth, supra note 282 (including infographic claiming
that proposed rule will not change exclusions and exemptions for agriculture).
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IMAGE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND, #DITCHTHERULE CAMPAIGN,
2014284
284 Am. Farm Bureau, supra note 282; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/
media/1454.
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EPA’S RESPONSE, #DITCHTHEMYTH, 2014285
Lost in this tussle between EPA and the American Farm Bureau
was an acknowledgement of the legal and technical complexities of
the rulemaking proceeding, which resulted in a 74-page final rule.286
Instead, simplified “facts” and “myths” were visually slung back and
forth in what looked much more like a political campaign than a tech-
nocratic process.
Thus, when it comes to the expertise rationale that is frequently
invoked to justify the legitimacy of agency rulemaking, visual commu-
nications present a mixed bag. On the one hand, visuals threaten to
oversimplify, to obscure, and to twist facts. Yet, on the other hand,
285 See Ditch the Myth, supra note 282; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/
media/1444.
286 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified in scattered parts of 33 C.F.R. and 40 C.F.R.).
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visuals also demonstrate that even purportedly technocratic rulemak-
ings often involve policy calls, thereby enhancing transparency in the
rulemaking process. In this sense, visuals shed much needed light on
what has always been true but is often unacknowledged: There is no
hermetically sealed division between expertise and politics in
rulemaking.
3. Public Participation
A third justification frequently offered in support of the legiti-
macy of agency rulemaking is that, although agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, they must allow significant public partici-
pation when promulgating rules.287 Agencies, for example, must pub-
lish detailed NPRMs in the Federal Register, alerting the public to
their proposed rules;288 they must give interested members of the
public an opportunity to present facts and arguments by filing com-
ments;289 and they must respond to all significant comments they
receive, ensuring that the notice-and-comment process is a meaningful
two-way interchange.290
E-rulemaking scholars focused on improving the effectiveness of
Rulemaking 2.0291 initiatives have identified three persistent barriers
that are thwarting broader, better participation in rulemaking: (1)
“[i]gnorance about the rulemaking process”; (2) “[u]nawareness that
rulemakings of interest are going on”; and (3) “[i]nformation
[o]verload from the length, and linguistic and cognitive density, of
287 See Watts, Constraining Certiorari, supra note 239, at 36 (noting that public
participation is a way in which rulemaking is subject to “significant external checks”).
288 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (requiring notice of proposed rules).
289 See id. § 553(c) (requiring that the public be given an opportunity to comment); see
also PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 243, § 7.3, at 583 (“The purpose
of the notice required by § 553(b) is to permit potentially affected members of the public
to file meaningful comments under § 553(c) criticizing (or supporting) the agency’s
proposal.”).
290 See, e.g., Reyblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (concluding that agencies must respond in reasoned manner to all significant
comments); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525,
530–31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that comment process is intended to ensure a “genuine
interchange” of views); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(“[T]here must be an exchange of views, information, and criticism between interested
persons and the agency.”).
291 See Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a
Vision for Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 77, 104 (2013) (describing “Rulemaking 2.0” as efforts “to take advantage of new
technologies to transform the notice-and-comment process into a more social and
collaborative process”).
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rulemaking materials.”292 Remarkably, however, in trying to address
these barriers, these scholars have remained fixated almost exclusively
on the textual world of rulemaking, seeking to develop new ways of
highlighting, clarifying, organizing, and inviting text.293 Meanwhile,
scholars and e-rulemaking pioneers have failed to consider the poten-
tial promise of the visual world.
This oversight is unfortunate. In a way that dense textual docu-
ments cannot, visuals promise to offer a quick and easy way of
drawing the public eye to noteworthy rulemakings. Visuals often dis-
till complex information into easy-to-digest pieces,294 and they pro-
vide a simple, engaging means of communicating. Thus, visuals offer a
significant and valuable means of overcoming many of the barriers
that currently exist to broader public participation in the rulemaking
process.
For example, EPA’s whiteboard video explaining the Clean
Power Plan has been viewed more than 29,000 times on YouTube.295
While this number is not overwhelming, it does indicate that EPA’s
outflow-oriented video is reaching a sizeable chunk of interested
viewers on a topic—the regulation of carbon pollution from power
plants—that everyday Americans might ordinarily dismiss as too com-
plex or too dull. Similarly, the President’s visuals draw national atten-
tion to regulatory action that has a direct effect on the lives of
everyday Americans but that otherwise might not catch their atten-
tion.296 Obama’s video message to the FCC on net neutrality is one
such example. It has been viewed nearly one million times on
YouTube.297
Visuals circulated by parties outside of the executive branch also
are encouraging the public to pay attention to the regulatory world.298
John Oliver’s late-night cable spot on net neutrality, which now has
292 Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking
and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 389–90 (2011) (emphasis
omitted).
293 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 405–06
(2011) (summarizing proposals to provide the public with “plain English” versions of rules
and to use the Internet to make it easier to find the text of rules); see also Johnson, supra
note 291 (describing barriers to public participation).
294 See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text (discussing the at-a-glance quality of
visuals).
295 Clean Power Plan Explained, supra note 124.
296 See supra Section II.B (discussing presidential use of visuals in the rulemaking
context).
297 See President’s Net Neutrality Video, supra note 9.
298 See supra Section II.C (discussing visuals circulated by rulemaking stakeholders
outside of executive branch).
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over ten million views, is a paradigmatic example.299 Another can be
found in the #DitchTheRule video parody based on the hit song “Let
It Go,” which, as we already noted, has been viewed on YouTube
more than 140,000 times300—a fairly high number for a video about
the regulation of water. In other words, visual rulemaking is exposing
regulatory proposals to the marketplace of ideas.
While these examples demonstrate that visuals are indeed being
used to raise public awareness of rulemakings and to enhance the
public’s voice, it remains uncertain whether they will lead to enhanced
and more meaningful public participation. Sometimes, as in the Karth
family’s efforts, these visual appeals from the public may have a direct
impact on the official rulemaking machinery.301 More often, however,
they simply represent political dialogue surrounding—but not neces-
sarily integrated into—rulemaking.
Even more significantly, it is unclear whether many citizens are
aware that their social media comments are typically not subsumed
into the agency’s official rulemaking record. Agencies can and should
take simple steps to make this clear to the public. For example, agency
infographics and visual tweets on proposed rules could embed links
that would take interested stakeholders straight to the relevant docket
folder on Regulations.gov, making it easier for the public to deter-
mine how to file comments. Similarly, agency videos could tell viewers
exactly how to file official comments on Regulations.gov, rather than
simply directing viewers to an agency’s website on the rulemaking.
And most importantly, agencies also should more clearly explain to
the public the distinction between “official” comments that become
part of the rulemaking record, and social media comments that gener-
ally do not.302  Indeed, as we discuss below, this last step is likely
required by the Administrative Procedure Act.303
Of course, these steps would be fairly simple for agencies to
implement, and so one must wonder why agencies have not taken
them already. The answer very likely rests, at least in part, in ambiva-
lence surrounding the value of public participation.304 Agencies might
well believe that increased public participation in the e-rulemaking
realm—whether or not it flows from visual prompts—is unlikely to
299 See John Oliver: Net Neutrality, supra note 1.
300 See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (explaining how EPA’s whiteboard
videos do not clearly explain how viewers could file official comments).
303 See infra Section III.B.1.a.
304 Cf. HERZ, supra note 60, at 22 (“[I]t is unclear that broad participation by the
general public is valuable in rulemaking.”).
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yield many relevant, informed comments. Or agencies might fear that
any increase in public participation would yield little other than a slew
of “me too” form letters,305 which agencies are generally quick to
dismiss.306
These concerns could prove valid. However, until agencies exper-
iment more with inflow-oriented visuals that aim to increase public
participation, it seems premature to give up the effort. Furthermore,
even if inflow-oriented visuals do generate little more than form let-
ters and “astroturf”-like email campaigns,307 there is still likely impor-
tant value added by the increased participation. Of course, agencies
should not make rulemaking decisions simply based on the number of
comments received in support of a certain position.308 Nonetheless, as
Nina Mendelson has argued, many rulemakings turn more on value-
laden judgment calls than on hard scientific facts, and it is in these
value-laden rulemaking proceedings that mass comments—whether
prompted by text or visuals—serve a useful role, making public
opinion on value-laden issues clear and encouraging agencies to take a
closer look at public opinion.309
This may have been part of what was at play in the FCC’s net
neutrality rulemaking. In that rulemaking, the FCC adopted strong
net neutrality rules after receiving and considering nearly four million
public comments,310 most of which strongly favored net neutrality.311
305 See HERZ, supra note 60, at 8–9 (stating that where rulemakings have generated
widespread public participation, “the comments have been dominated by duplicative
submissions resulting from organized ‘astroturf’ campaigns,” which can result in “[t]ens or
hundreds of thousands of near-identical submissions”); Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking,
Democracy, and Torrents of E-mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1361 (2011) (noting that
campaigns encouraging the public to comment have resulted in a flood of “form letters,
postcards, or e-mails to an agency, each with identical or near-identical text”).
306 See Mendelson, supra note 305, at 1363–64 (discussing how agencies “occasionally
acknowledge the number of lay comments and the sentiments they express [but] they very
rarely appear to give them any significant weight”).
307 See supra note 305 (discussing “astroturf” comment campaigns).
308 See Nina A. Mendelson, Should Mass Comments Count?, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 173, 181 (2012) (stating that “[t]he rulemaking process is not a plebicite, to be
sure, and relative volumes of public comments should not be viewed by agency officials as
dispositive”).
309 Id. at 180–81 (discussing how mass comments help support fully reasoned agency
process and help rulemakers gauge public opinion); see also id. at 175 (arguing that mass
comments “at least deserve consideration by the agency as part of a well-reasoned agency
deliberation process”).
310 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738, 19,739 (Apr. 13,
2015) (to be codified in scattered parts of 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 20, 22, 28, 29, 32, 34, 38, 40, 45,
and 49 C.F.R.).
311 See id. at 19,746 (“[I]t is clear that the majority of comments support Commission
action to protect the open Internet.”); Elise Hu, 3.7 Million Comments Later, Here’s Where
Net Neutrality Stands, NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:12 PM), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/09/17/349243335/3-7-million-comments-later-
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About half of these comments were duplicative rather than unique.312
Yet the FCC expressly acknowledged the value of the comments in its
final rule, stating: “Congress could not have imagined when it enacted
the APA almost seventy years ago that the day would come when
nearly 4 million Americans would exercise their right to comment on
a proposed rulemaking. But that is what has happened in this pro-
ceeding and it is a good thing.”313
In sum, visual rulemaking has the potential to strengthen and fur-
ther democratize public participation, even though this potential has
yet to be fully tapped. It also promises to advance transparency and
political accountability in the regulatory world. Yet visual rulemaking
poses serious risks as well, including the risk that visual appeals may
turn high-stakes rulemakings into viral political battles, undermining
the expert-driven foundations of the regulatory state. As visual
rulemaking continues to grow, these risks and benefits should be reas-
sessed to ensure that visual rulemaking furthers rather than under-
mines the fundamental values that underpin the regulatory state.
B. Doctrinal Implications
In addition to raising theoretical issues, the emergence of a visual
rulemaking world has important legal implications. In particular, the
use of visuals in the rulemaking realm is likely to raise significant legal
issues in at least four key doctrinal areas: (1) Section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA); (2) the APA’s “record”
requirement, which flows from Section 706 of the APA; (3) the First
Amendment; and (4) various anti-lobbying and anti-propaganda
laws.314 This Section considers each in turn.
heres-where-net-neutrality-stands (noting that one study of the first 800,000 comments
found that “fewer than 1 percent were opposed to net neutrality enforcement”).
312 See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. at 19,746 (“[B]y some
estimates, nearly half of all comments received by the Commission were unique.”).
313 Id. at 19,739.
314 Other legal issues might surface as well. For example, copyright questions could
arise. See generally EPA Comment Policy, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/home/epa-comment-policy [https://perma.cc/XG86-U3JJ] (last updated July
16, 2015) (“Copyrighted and other proprietary material should not be posted or submitted
in any form unless permission to do so is clearly indicated.”). In addition, questions might
arise concerning whether undocketed textual or visual communications between an agency
and stakeholders that occur online violate agencies’ policies on ex parte contacts. See
HERZ, supra note 60, at 87–89 (noting that although the APA itself does not bar ex parte
contacts in notice-and-comment rulemakings, agencies’ use of social media to interact
online with public stakeholders might nonetheless implicate agencies’ own ex parte contact
policies); see also ESA L. SFERRA-BONISTALLI, EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS IN INFORMAL
RULEMAKING: FINAL REPORT 81–83, 87–88 (2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Final%20Ex%20Parte%20Communications%20in%20Informal%20
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1. Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
The APA, which was enacted in 1946,315 sets out three central
procedural requirements that govern notice-and-comment
rulemaking: (1) agencies must provide the public with notice of the
proposed rulemaking;316 (2) agencies must allow “interested persons
an opportunity” to comment on the proposed rule through the “sub-
mission of written data, views, or arguments”; and (3) an agency’s
final rule must be accompanied by a statement of basis and pur-
pose.317 These statutory requirements were not written with the
modern, quintessentially visual, age in mind.318 As a result, nothing in
the APA expressly speaks to agencies’ or others’ use of visuals in the
rulemaking realm. Nonetheless, if agencies are not careful, their use
and treatment of visuals could run afoul of the APA’s general notice-
and-comment requirements.
a. The Adequacy of Agencies’ Notices
Agencies’ creation of two rulemaking worlds—one visual and
one textual—and their failure to clearly notify the public of the differ-
ence between the two, very likely violates the APA’s notice require-
ment. The APA requires that agencies’ NPRMs include, among other
things, “a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule
making proceedings.”319 At its core, this notice requirement is
designed to facilitate public participation and debate, ensuring that
notices are sufficient to “afford interested parties a reasonable oppor-
tunity to participate in the rulemaking process.”320
Currently, when agencies deploy online visuals in order to invite
feedback from the public on proposed rules, they routinely fail to
clearly notify the public of whether or not that invited feedback will
be considered official “comments,” triggering agencies’ obligation to
consider the comments and to respond to all significant comments
Rulemaking%20%5B5-1-14%5D_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM9X-BQ2M] (discussing
interplay between agencies’ use of social media and agencies’ ex parte contact policies).
315 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
316 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
317 Id. § 553(c).
318 Cf. HERZ, supra note 60, at 67 (noting that confusion has surrounded agencies’ use
of social media during rulemakings as “the APA was not written with these tools in mind”).
319 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1).
320 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Fla.
Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also Friends of
Iwo Jima v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, 176 F.3d 768, 774 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
purpose of providing notice [is] soliciting comments and fostering debate . . . .”).
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received.321 To the extent that this lack of clarity prevents the public
from understanding the proper forum for participating in the official
rulemaking process, it undermines the central purpose of the APA’s
notice requirement by confusing the public about where to submit
comments.322
Consider the overtime pay rulemaking from the Department of
Labor.323 DOL’s web page on the proposed rulemaking featured a
large, colorful infographic, which included a “share your story”
button.324 That button linked to a separate web page that flashed
alternating images of a letter, an envelope, and a smartphone and that
asked viewers: “What would getting paid overtime mean to you?”325
The page invited members of the public to fill out various textual
boxes and to thereby “share” their story with DOL.326 Nothing on this
page, however, explained the difference between the unofficial, online
comments it sought and official comments that would be included in
the rulemaking docket. As a result, a citizen would be entirely justi-
fied in assuming that filling out the “share your story” form was an
appropriate mechanism for participating in the rulemaking. Yet, as
DOL’s official NPRM that was published in the Federal Register sug-
gested, that was not the case. Indeed, DOL’s NPRM stated that com-
ments could be filed in only two ways: electronically via Regulations
.gov or via snail mail.327 Thus, although DOL’s official notice in the
Federal Register was clear (when read in isolation) as to where and
how to file comments, DOL’s web page in which readers could share
their stories could very well have misled public stakeholders. EPA’s
321 See, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (“An agency need not address every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned
manner to those that raise significant problems.”); see also La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v.
Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Am. Mining Cong. v.
U.S. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (stating that the agency in question
needed to respond to comments which “would require a change in [the] proposed rule”).
322 In the context of his ACUS report on social media and rulemaking, Michael Herz
reached a similar conclusion, although he framed this as a commenting rather than a notice
issue. See HERZ, supra note 60, at 75 (“If a layperson would be reasonably misled into
thinking that the social media discussion was an official forum for commenting, then a
strong argument could be made that the agency is interfering with or denying the
opportunity to comment.”).
323 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing DOL’s overtime pay
rulemaking).
324 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 108.
325 See Overtime/Share, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/overtime/
share [https://perma.cc/J67L-USE8] (last visited July 3, 2016).
326 Id.
327 See Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 99.
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whiteboard video on its proposed Clean Water Rule, discussed above,
suffers from the same problems.328
A November 2015 Facebook post by FDA provides an additional
example. The post, which includes a large photo of colorful fruits and
vegetables, asks viewers: “What is ‘natural’?”329 It invites members of
the public to share their feedback with FDA on what the term “nat-
ural” should mean in the context of food labeling330:
FDA’S VISUAL ANNOUNCEMENT INVITING COMMENTS ON USE OF
TERM “NATURAL,” 2015331
Text accompanying the visual Facebook announcement does con-
tain a link leading directly to an FDA webpage, which prominently
and clearly notifies interested stakeholders how and where they can
file official comments.332 Nonetheless, because Facebook allows users
to “comment” on posts (indeed, more than 120 Facebook users com-
mented on this particular post),333 the visual announcement still leaves
328 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA White Board Video: Clean Water Act Rule
Proposal Explained, supra note 135 (calling for public input on EPA’s Clean Water Rule,
but failing to indicate where to submit comments that would be considered in the
rulemaking and whether comments submitted to EPA’s YouTube page would be
considered in the rulemaking).




331 Id.; image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1449.
332 “Natural” on Food Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/
ucm456090.htm [https://perma.cc/7983-UW3Q] (updated Dec. 24, 2015).
333 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 329.
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the door open to confusion. In particular, viewers who fail to click
through to the linked page might reasonably conclude that they could
participate in FDA’s proceedings simply by commenting on FDA’s
Facebook post.334
As these examples illustrate, by creating two separate rulemaking
universes—one characterized by its social, highly visual nature and
another characterized by text and legalese—agencies risk confusing
public stakeholders as to which universe serves as the proper forum
for registering comments on proposed rules. If an agency only wants
to include feedback filed in the highly textual, legalistic universe as
official comments that must be considered by the agency, then it needs
to clearly notify public stakeholders of this fact.335 This notification
should occur not just in its official Federal Register documents but
also in the online visuals that affirmatively invite public feedback.
Alternatively, if an agency wants both universes to serve as proper
forums for filing comments that will constitute part of the official
rulemaking record and that will trigger the agency’s obligation to con-
sider the comments, then the agency must be clear about that.336
Ultimately, we believe the latter approach—merging the two
worlds—is likely required in light of the APA’s “record” requirement,
which we discuss below.337 Regardless, the APA’s notice requirement
standing alone does not bar agencies’ use of visuals in the rulemaking
context so long as agencies clearly notify the public of what distinc-
tions, if any, exist between providing feedback in one forum or
another. Indeed, if agencies provide this clarity, “visual announce-
ments”—whether posted to Facebook, YouTube, Twitter or other
social media sites—are a potentially valuable new tool that can be
deployed in addition to the official, textual NPRMs in order to reach a
broader audience.
334 FDA’s official notice published in the Federal Register explains that there are only
two approved methods of submitting comments: (1) sending them electronically via
Regulations.gov; or (2) delivering written/paper submissions via the mail, courier or by
hand. Use of the Term “Natural” in the Labeling of Human Food Products, 80 Fed. Reg.
69,905, 69,905 (Nov. 12, 2015).
335 Cf. Adoption of Recommendations, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2265 (Jan. 17, 2012)
(recommending that agencies promoting discussions of rulemaking on social media
“provide clear notice as to whether and how [they] will use the discussion in the
rulemaking proceeding”).
336 As an example of an agency explicitly notifying the public that official comments can
be filed in both types of forums, see Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry
Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,638, 62,638–39 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
pt. 8) (identifying various methods for submitting comments, including via two selected
blogs).
337 See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing how agencies should include both textual and
visual communications in the administrative record).
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b. The Adequacy of Text-Bound Comments
As visuals continue to seep into the rulemaking arena, another
APA-related question will likely arise: Must agencies allow public
stakeholders to file visual materials, such as videos and infographics, if
a commenter wishes to do so? Or could agencies allow only written
comments? At least one agency, EPA, has already grappled with these
questions, opting in favor of a policy that allows commenters to file
multimedia submissions but that requires that such submissions “be
accompanied by a written comment.”338 According to the policy, only
“[t]he written comment is considered the official comment.”339
Indeed, the written comment must “include discussion of all points
[the commenter] wish[es] to make.”340
EPA’s insistence that only written comments will be considered
“official” makes sense from a logistical perspective. Videos and
images are not as easily searchable as text,341 and, as a result, the
agency is likely concerned that it would be logistically difficult—and
quite resource intensive—for “it” to process and consider multimedia
submissions. “Link rot” and “reference rot” pose further problems.
Link rot occurs when a link no longer works, while reference rot
occurs when a link’s content changes.342 Given the prevalence of these
phenomena,343 if the agency considers comments that are embedded
within links, there is a strong likelihood that many of those links will
eventually disappear or change, impoverishing the administrative
record. Also, storing permanent links for all such sites in order to
avoid this issue might be a significant administrative burden.
338 See Commenting on EPA Dockets, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/dockets/commenting-epa-dockets#rules [https://perma.cc/NS9D-MTG5] (last
updated July 14, 2016).
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Currently, the text element of images may be searchable but the images themselves
are not. See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FED. DOCKET MGMT. SYS.,
https://perma.cc/R9DX-MH67 (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) (“If the system identifies the
attachment as an ‘Image Only’ file, the document is run through an automated Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) process that renders the document into a ‘Text Searchable’
.pdf file. This process adds a ‘text layer’ to the .pdf so that any recognizable text in the
image is identified.”).
342 See Jonathan Zittrain, Kendra Albert & Lawrence Lessig, Perma: Scoping and
Addressing the Problem of Link and Reference Rot in Legal Citations, 127 HARV. L. REV.
F. 176, 177 (2014) (providing definitions of these terms).
343 See id. at 180 (finding that link rot or reference rot affects 50% of links in Supreme
Court opinions through the Court’s October Term 2011); see also The Chesapeake Dig.
Pres. Grp., “Link Rot” and Legal Resources on the Web—2015 Data, LEGAL INFO.
ARCHIVE, http://cdm266901.cdmhost.com/cdm/linkrot2015#orig (last visited July 4, 2016)
(providing results of research that checked a set of web links since 2008 and finding that, as
of 2015, 53% of the links “no longer went to the original resources”).
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Furthermore, the text of the APA seems to put EPA and other
agencies that want to limit stakeholders’ ability to file visual com-
ments on solid ground. Section 553(c), after all, merely requires agen-
cies to give interested persons the opportunity to present “written
data, views, or arguments.”344 Yet the APA was not drafted with
modern digital media in mind, and an agency’s refusal to consider
visual comments as part of the rulemaking record could potentially
interfere with the central purpose of the comment requirement: ena-
bling meaningful public participation.345 Currently there may be tech-
nological barriers to agencies’ incorporation of visual comments. But
due to constantly advancing technology, those limitations are likely
temporary; in any event, they do not alter the need for agencies to
gather input in whatever forms are most meaningful. As a result,
agencies should likely exercise caution when adopting policies that
prohibit or severely restrict commenters’ use of visuals,346 and, in any
event, agencies should make whatever policies they do adopt on this
matter clear.
c. The Adequacy of Agencies’ Consideration of Comments
Finally, agencies’ use of visuals to campaign for proposed rules
could call into question the legitimacy of agencies’ consideration of
public comments—particularly when the agency’s campaign is part
and parcel of a broader political campaign being pushed by the
President. The APA’s comment requirement rests on the assumption
that agencies will “maintain minds open to whatever insights the com-
ments produced by notice under § 553 may generate.”347 Although
courts recognize that agency policymakers must be allowed to “discuss
the wisdom of various regulatory positions”348 and thus need not
remain entirely neutral, courts also have held that agency policy-
makers may not have an “unalterably closed mind on matters critical
to the disposition of the proceeding.”349 This rule makes sense in the
344 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
345 See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing
how, under the APA, interested parties must be provided a “reasonable opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking process”).
346 Cf. HERZ, supra note 60, at 74 (“[T]here have to be some limits on the agency’s
ability to define what a ‘comment’ is.”).
347 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
348 See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting
that the ability to have such discussions is necessary for the FTC to use “its broad
policymaking power” under the specific statute governing FTC rulemaking).
349 Id.; see also Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 183 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (quoting Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 663 F.3d 476, 487 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (“[A]n individual should be disqualified from rulemaking only when there has
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context of notice-and-comment rulemaking because, as one court has
explained, “[a]llowing the public to submit comments to an agency
that has already made its decision is no different from prohibiting
comments altogether.”350
Given that agencies must consider comments with an open mind,
agencies should ensure that their visuals—especially outflow-oriented
visuals designed to promote proposed rules that tie to the President’s
political agenda—do not turn into what appear to be uncompromising
advocacy campaigns. Otherwise, those who wish to challenge an
agency’s final rule will likely point to the visual campaigns as evidence
that the agency had an unalterably closed mind.
Indeed, EPA’s aggressive visual social media campaign, which it
unleashed during the comment period on its proposed Clean Water
Rule, has already prompted such claims. One legal complaint chal-
lenging EPA’s Clean Water Rule, for example, alleges that EPA
“engag[ed] in an unprecedented advocacy campaign that led to a dis-
torted and biased comment process” and  “undermined the proper
functioning of the notice-and-comment process.”351 In a similar vein,
the New York Times quoted one scholar as asserting that EPA’s social
media campaign clashed with the idea that agencies serve as “honest
broker[s]” rather than “partisan advocate[s].”352
To avoid these claims moving forward, agencies will need to care-
fully attend to the line between, on the one hand, using visuals to edu-
cate the public and to promote the wisdom of their regulatory
proposals and, on the other hand, using visuals as part of uncompro-
mising, relentless advocacy campaigns. In addition, when deploying
inflow-oriented visuals that directly link to the official rulemaking
record, agencies should take care to avoid asking overly loaded or
overly simplified questions (such as “Do You Choose Clean
Water?”353) that could be read to invite only one point of view. If
been a clear and convincing showing that the . . . member has an unalterably closed mind
on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.”).
350 Nehemiah Corp. of Am. v. Jackson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 830, 847 (E.D. Cal. 2008); see
also Nat. Res. Def. Council, 859 F.2d at 194 (“[A] binding promise to promulgate in the
proposed form would seem to defeat Congress’s evident intention that agencies proceeding
by informal rulemaking should maintain minds open to whatever insights the comments . . .
may generate.”).
351 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, 28, Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v.
EPA, No. 3:15-cv-00165 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2015).
352 See Eric Lipton & Coral Davenport, Critics Hear E.P.A.’s Voice in ‘Public
Comments,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2015, at A1 (quoting Professor Jeffrey W. Lubbers).
353 See Travis Loop, Do You Choose Clean Water?, EPA BLOG: OUR PLANET, OUR
HOME (Sept. 9, 2014), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2014/09/do-you-choose-clean-water/
(asking readers to participate in a “virtual flash mob” in support of the EPA’s Clean Water
Rule).
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agencies fail to pay careful attention to this line—particularly when
using visuals during comment periods as part of broader presidential
efforts—they will invite questions about whether they improperly
began the rulemaking with a decision already in mind, which would
thwart the entire point of the comment process.
2. The APA’s “Whole Record” Requirement
The use of visuals in rulemaking also raises questions relating to
the APA’s “whole record” requirement, which stems from Section 706
of the APA.354 If an agency’s final rule is challenged in court, Section
706 directs courts to review the rule based on the “whole record” cre-
ated by the agency355—often referred to today as the “administrative
record.”356 In informal, notice-and-comment rulemakings, the APA
does not elaborate on what should constitute the “whole record.”357
Nor does it explain how agencies should compile administrative
records for judicial review.358 Nonetheless, courts have clarified the
“record” requirement over time, declaring that the administrative
record must contain materials that are considered in some manner by
the agency, not just those materials that the agency actually relied
upon.359 An agency may not, for example, “skew the record by
excluding unfavorable information” that was before it when it made
its decision.360 Notably, however, courts grant agencies “a presump-
tion that [they] properly designated the administrative record absent
354 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
355 Id.
356 See LELAND E. BECK, AGENCY PRACTICES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING 2 (May 14, 2013), https://
www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Agency%20Practices%20and%20Judicial%20
Review%20of%20Administrative%20Records%20in%20Informal%20Rulemaking.pdf
(explaining that the “whole record” is now generally referred to as the “administrative
record”).
357 See id. at 2 (“The APA provides little guidance on the creation and compilation of
the ‘whole record’ or ‘administrative record’ as it has come to be known.”).
358 See id.
359 See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The
‘whole’ administrative record . . . consists of all documents and materials directly or
indirectly considered by agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the
agency’s position.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 91
F.R.D. 26, 33 (N.D. Tex. 1981)); Tafas v. Dudas, 530 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793–94 (E.D. Va.
2008) (“The whole administrative record includes pertinent but unfavorable information,
and an agency may not exclude information on the ground that it did not ‘rely’ on that
information in its final decision.”); see also Ad Hoc Metals Coal. v. Whitman, 227 F. Supp.
2d 134, 139 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that EPA needed to include in the administrative
record a transcript it considered but “did not ‘rely’ upon”).
360 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 118 F. Supp. 3d 244, 246 (D.D.C. 2015)
(quoting Blue Ocean Inst. v. Gutierrez, 503 F. Supp. 2d 366, 369 (D.D.C. 2007)).
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clear evidence to the contrary.”361 In practice this has meant that
agencies’ record determinations are final except in rare circumstances,
such as where an agency deliberately excludes adverse documents362
or acts in bad faith.363
These judicial glosses have important implications for agencies’
current attempts to keep the official rulemaking record separate from
the more visual rulemaking records that they are creating or engaging
with online. An agency’s failure to include its videos in the administra-
tive record—or an agency’s omission of written feedback submitted
by the public in response to an agency video, tweet, or other commu-
nication—might lead to disputes over the sufficiency of the adminis-
trative record. For example, it would seem problematic for EPA to
omit from the administrative record all visual communications from
its #DitchTheMyth campaign, which responded to the opposing
#DitchTheRule campaign. Similarly, it would be implausible for EPA
to claim that it did not consider—and that it could therefore exclude
from the administrative record—videos circulated by members of the
public that EPA itself retweeted via its Twitter account.364 In response
to claims that these kinds of communications must be included in the
administrative record, a court might be able to take judicial notice of
any communications publicly posted to the agency’s own website or to
its social media sites.365 In order to avoid creating the impression that
it is trying to sweep visual advocacy campaigns under the rug, EPA
and other similarly situated agencies should simply include such com-
munications in the administrative record from the get-go.366
361 Lee Mem’l Hosp. v. Burwell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Fund for
Animals v. Williams, 391 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2005)).
362 See Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting the
D.C. Circuit’s holding that the administrative record could only be supplemented in three
scenarios, including when the agency has purposefully omitted documents from the
record).
363 See, e.g., Fence Creek Cattle Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 602 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir.
2010) (rejecting plaintiffs’ request to supplement the administrative record with certain
files on the basis that plaintiff did not show that the agency omitted the files in bad faith);
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 943 (9th Cir. 2006)
(noting that the court may add material to the record when plaintiff shows that the agency
acted in bad faith); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating
that “an extra-record investigation . . . may be appropriate when there has been a strong
showing in support of a claim of bad faith or improper behavior on the part of agency
decisionmakers”).
364 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (noting EPA’s retweeting of videos
created by public stakeholders).
365 Cf. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 705 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (taking
judicial notice of Notice of Allowance for trademark on the website of the Patent and
Trademark Office).
366 The one major downside to doing so would be practical: As agencies increasingly
engage in textual and visual communication with public stakeholders online, the distinction
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In addition, when justifying a final rule, an agency may not rely
upon materials that are not in the rulemaking record.367 Put another
way, upon review, courts require that agency decisions be based on
materials that are actually in the record.368 Thus, the artificial separa-
tion that agencies are currently trying to maintain between the “unof-
ficial” visual rulemaking world and the “official” textual, legalistic
rulemaking world will necessarily break down if agencies try to justify
their final rules by relying upon communications the agency received
in the visual, online world. In order to rely upon such communica-
tions, the agency should include them in the rulemaking record,
thereby connecting the two rulemaking worlds.
All of this suggests that a merger of the visual and textual worlds
may ultimately be required. Agencies could achieve such a merger by
simply including in the record all visuals that they deployed in the
rulemaking proceeding (outflow), all visuals submitted to agency-
sponsored sites by public stakeholders (inflow), and all textual feed-
back provided to agencies over social media channels. Doing so would
not only help to avoid issues with the record, but it would also prevent
the issues with notice discussed earlier. The APA was drafted in an
earlier, less visual time. But its spirit strongly suggests that agencies
should incorporate the products of visual rulemaking culture into the
four corners of rulemaking proceedings.
3. The First Amendment
The tensions between the two rulemaking universes we describe
here—the legalistic/factual and the visual/political—also raise signifi-
cant First Amendment issues for agencies. As discussed above, visuals
are laden with emotion.369 Particularly because of this emotional
tinge, when visually communicated statements bleed into the techno-
cratic universe, both courts and agencies may silence or ignore them,
deeming such speech inappropriate or irrelevant to some aspect of the
regulatory process. Within constraints, the First Amendment may tol-
between the rulemaking record and the World Wide Web might be difficult to maintain,
thus rendering the administrative record unwieldy in size. See HERZ, supra note 60, at 74
n.323 (“Integration of the electronic rulemaking docket with social media discussions and
the web as a whole might ultimately blow apart the model of the all-inclusive record . . . .”).
367 See HERZ, supra note 60, at 73 (“[M]aterial that is not put into the rulemaking
docket, either by the agency or by the public submitter, cannot be relied on to justify the
final rule . . . .”).
368 See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curiam) (“[T]he focal point for
judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new
record made initially in the reviewing court.”); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (noting that evidence consisting of “‘post hoc’
rationalizations” has “traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for review”).
369 See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
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erate that silencing.370 The proliferation of social media visuals sur-
rounding high-stakes rulemakings, as well as the rising appeal of using
visuals as elements of regulations themselves, requires a reexamina-
tion of the role of the First Amendment in protecting visual contribu-
tions to the regulatory world.371
a. Visual Participation in Rulemaking
Agencies take in public commentary on proposed regulations in
many forms. As described above, currently there is a divide between
the “official” rulemaking docket—which continues to be dominated
by institutional stakeholders and textual analysis—and the more
visual/political commentary online. In both of these realms, agencies
place restrictions on public comments. On Regulations.gov, for
example, agencies seek to restrict comments to protect privacy and
maintain civility.372 Similarly, in the more visual regulatory universe,
when agency-sponsored social media sites welcome public comments,
they frequently moderate those comments, either before or after
posting, for both relevance and decorum.373 FDA’s Facebook policy,
for example, prohibits posters from “[s]preading misleading or false
information,” and it asks that posters refrain from “comments that
370 See Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2392, 2404–08 (2014) (discussing how D.C. Circuit struck down FDA’s
proposed graphic warnings for cigarettes on grounds that images did not provide relevant
factual information and were overly emotional).
371 See id. at 2393 (“[C]urrent First Amendment law doesn’t have a consistent account
of the proper role of emotion in speech regulation.”).
372 A standard disclaimer on Regulations.gov comment sections for rules states:
“Agencies review all submissions, however some agencies may choose to redact, or
withhold, certain submissions (or portions thereof) such as those containing private or
proprietary information, inappropriate language, or duplicate/near duplicate examples of a
mass-mail campaign.” E.g., Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive,
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=WHD-2015-0001-0001 (last visited July 5, 2016)
(inserting standard comment publication disclaimer into overtime rulemaking docket).
373 See, e.g., Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, YouTube Policy, YOUTUBE, https://
www.youtube.com/user/FEMA/about [https://perma.cc/R328-XXHL] (last visited July 7,
2016) (stating that agency reviews comments and will not allow comments that are, for
instance “off-topic,” “vulgar,” “personal attacks,” or “advertisements” to be posted);
United States Census Bureau, Comment Policy, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: RANDOM
SAMPLINGS (Sept. 10, 2010), http://blogs.census.gov/2010/09/10/comment-policy/ [https://per
ma.cc/7YFQ-V93N] (“[W]e expect conversations to follow the conventions of polite
discourse” and therefore “try to remove any objectionable content.”); EPA Comment
Policy, supra note 314 (stating that EPA “expect[s] comments generally to be courteous”
and will not post comments that include, for instance, hate speech, profane language,
defamatory statements, or product promotions).
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contain partisan political statements.”374 Other agency policies are
similar.375 These policies reflect agencies’ understandable wish to
encourage dialogue without allowing it to degenerate into irrelevant
or offensive tirades that fail to advance the regulatory discussion.
Especially when broadly worded, however, agencies’ social media
comment policies raise significant First Amendment questions, and
the risk of unconstitutional exclusion of speech may be particularly
acute when the speech takes visual form.
Scholars who have recently begun to analyze the impact of the
First Amendment on agency social media have divided agency-related
speech into two categories.376 The first category is government speech,
in which the government itself is considered the only speaker.377 This
category does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny, and agencies
therefore have unfettered editorial control when speaking unilater-
ally.378 The second category, which covers situations where govern-
ment and private speech are intermingled, is a limited public forum.379
Agency websites, agency Twitter feeds, and other one-way forms
of communication fall within the first category.380 In these contexts,
agencies may refuse to include views that are contrary to their own.381
Those few courts that have examined the question have agreed that
governments selecting items for inclusion on their websites are
engaged in government speech, and thus they may exclude speech that
374 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Facebook Comment Policy, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/FDA/app/1646495632251303/ [https://perma.cc/X9GF-BHUX] (last
visited July 7, 2016).
375 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Facebook Comment Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/facebook-comment-policy
[https://perma.cc/5WWZ-THT3] (listing specific reasons for rejecting posts, and also
stating authority to reject comments that are “otherwise objectionable”).
376 See HERZ, supra note 60, at 82–85 (discussing where agency websites and social
media sites fall under First Amendment doctrine’s categories of speech); see also Alissa
Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 301, 304 (2013) (discussing whether agency social media sites are government speech
or limited public forums, and arguing that such sites are the latter).
377 See HERZ, supra note 60, at 82 (“Agency web sites, for example, are almost entirely
a forum for agency speech.”).
378 See David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment
Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 BYU L. REV.
1981, 1983–84 (2010) (“The government speech doctrine, however, grants the government
nearly carte blanche ability to exclude speakers and speech on the basis of viewpoint so
long as the government can show that it ‘effectively controlled’ the message being
conveyed.”).
379 See HERZ, supra note 60, at 84 (“[W]ithin a limited public forum, content-based
(though not viewpoint-based) restrictions are permissible.”).
380 See id. at 82 (noting that these forms of communication are government speech since
“the government is speaking”).
381 See id. (noting that agencies can “take sides” when acting as government speakers).
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other parties seek to have included.382 The Supreme Court’s 2015
decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. supports this broad application of the government speech doc-
trine to agency-controlled websites.383 Despite the obviously tight
intermingling of state and individual speech on vanity license plates,
the Court characterized vanity plates as government speech and held
that a state could reject a proposed plate featuring the Confederate
battle flag. Even though agency websites similarly mix state and indi-
vidual speech, courts following Sons of Confederate Veterans would
likely find that an agency is still engaged in government speech on its
website and would thus have the right to exclude speech.
However, when agencies create online “space for dialogue,
exchange, and the receipt of public input,”384 they lose the protec-
tion—and the unfettered discretion—of the government speech doc-
trine.385 So, for example, agency-sponsored Facebook or YouTube
accounts that accept comments, agency blogs that solicit public com-
mentary, and Regulations.gov, which is dedicated to collecting public
comments related to rulemaking, do not constitute forms of govern-
ment speech—or at least they are not solely government speech.386
Instead, these agency-initiated dialogues are likely “limited public
forums” for First Amendment purposes.387  In limited public forums,
382 See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 329–32, 335 (1st Cir. 2009)
(finding that a town’s selection of hyperlinks to include on its website constituted
government speech, thereby allowing the town to exclude certain hyperlinks from its
website); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2008)
(holding that school district’s use of its website to campaign against proposed legislation
was government speech, thereby allowing the district to exclude a proponent of the
legislation from using the website to campaign for the legislation).
383 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–44,
2246 (2015); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (holding
that a town’s installation in a public park of a donated Ten Commandments monument was
government speech, thereby allowing the town to decline to install the monument to
Summum religion).
384 HERZ, supra note 60, at 82; Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975,
1997–98 (2011) (discussing the extent and limit of agencies’ authority over speech in
interactive government social media sites).
385 HERZ, supra note 60, at 82 (discussing how agency social media sites do not involve
one-way government communication and thus do not qualify as government speech).
386 See Lidsky, supra note 384 (noting that interactive government Facebook accounts,
such as the White House Facebook page, “might involve both government speech and a
public forum,” but concluding that many such sites are “likely to be categorized as limited
public forums”).
387 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983)
(“A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups, or for
the discussion of certain subjects.” (citation omitted)); Lidsky, supra note 384, at 1984
(“[T]he government may engage in some types of content-based discrimination to define
the (limited) range of subjects to be discussed in the forum and to preserve those limits
once established.”).
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the government retains significant latitude to regulate private speech,
but restrictions must be reasonable and must not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint.388 The precise lines between reasonable and unrea-
sonable and between viewpoint neutral and viewpoint discriminatory
are difficult to draw with certainty—and the interpretive challenges of
visuals might exacerbate that difficulty.
In some regulatory contexts, the government’s exclusion of visual
forms of speech within a limited public forum might be uncontrover-
sial. For example, in a recent proceeding by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) relating to male circumcision and the
prevention of HIV infection, the notice seeking public comment on a
draft recommendation stated that it would not consider or post com-
ments containing vulgar language, or comments intended to promote
commercial products.389 In addition, the notice specifically stated that
it would not post any images or pictures that were submitted.390
Presumably the agency had no wish to create a database of circumci-
sion-related photos.
However, in closer cases, agency implementation of supposedly
viewpoint-neutral policies might result in agencies excluding relevant
but emotionally laden images from the regulatory dialogue. This risk
seems especially relevant to agencies’ interactive social media sites.
For example, the distinction between rejecting a potential post as
“misleading,” as the FDA’s Facebook policy would uphold, and
rejecting the post because it expresses a disfavored viewpoint, seems
too fine-grained.391 Defining “partisan political” comments seems
even more fraught. Would a government agency remove a Facebook
post by a user whose profile photo contained a Confederate flag
because the photo was “partisan” in a regulatory discussion relating to
race? It is also possible that agencies might choose to prohibit visual
388 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (reaffirming that in a limited public forum, “[a]ny access
barrier must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[G]overnment has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). See generally Joseph Blocher,
Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 696–97, 751–53 (2011)
(discussing tension between viewpoint neutrality and government speech, and suggesting
that commitment to viewpoint neutrality be modified).
389 Recommendations for Providers Counseling Male Patients and Parents Regarding
Male Circumcision and the Prevention of HIV Infection, STIs, and Other Health
Outcomes, 79 Fed. Reg. 71,433, 71,433 (Dec. 2, 2014).
390 Id.
391 See Lidsky, supra note 384, at 2001–02 (observing that “[t]his question about how
much deference to give government actors in regulating profane or ‘abusive’ speech in
online forums is particularly pressing because computer mediated communications are
more likely than those in the ‘real world’ to become profane or abusive”).
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comments entirely. As the graphic cigarette warning cases discussed
below indicate,392 precisely because images can invoke visceral, emo-
tional responses, they might be perceived as more partisan, more mis-
leading, or less relevant, than would an analogous textual comment.
Finally, if agencies adopt our suggestion that they should incorporate
comments received through social media channels regarding proposed
regulations, they might have an increased incentive to use vague terms
such as “objectionable” or “partisan” to edit those social media posts
in order to prevent some types of comments from entering the admin-
istrative record.
The Supreme Court has not yet integrated government speech or
the limited public forum doctrine into the realm of e-rulemaking, so
the contours of these doctrinal boundaries remain blurry. In light of
the significant democratic benefits of government-sponsored social
media,393 the Court is likely to grant agencies discretion to moderate
those sites as limited public forums to maintain their civility and
utility. However, there is a risk that the law’s general mistrust of the
visual could lead to under-protection of visual speech in social media
dialogues with agencies about regulatory issues.
b. Visual Regulation
The emotionally laden nature of visuals may also result in the
silencing of visual speech in another facet of rulemaking: the integra-
tion by agencies of visuals into federal rules themselves. As visuals
play an increasing role in rulemaking, enhanced by the rapid evolution
of visual technologies, this new visual language will spill over into the
substance of regulations. Indeed, as described above, some regulations
already contain visual elements.394 Frequently these visual regulations
involve warnings that seek to inform, and also to influence, consumer
choice.395 But the very reason that the warnings may be effective—
their emotional power—has rendered them suspect to courts under
the First Amendment.
The most famous example of this emotional taint in a regulatory
context is the rejection in 2012 by the D.C. Circuit of FDA regulations
mandating graphic warnings on cigarette labels. In 2009, Congress
392 See infra note 399 and accompanying images and text (discussing various federal
courts’ rejection of graphic cigarette warnings proposed by the FDA).
393 See Lidsky, supra note 384, at 2003–10 (arguing that government websites build
community engagement, are efficient and responsive, crowdsource decision making, and
improve access to younger citizens).
394 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
395 Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional
Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 515 (2014).
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directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
issue regulations requiring cigarette manufacturers to use warning
labels that included “color graphics depicting the negative health con-
sequences of smoking.”396 Pursuant to this instruction, FDA, which
sits within HHS, proposed and in 2011 finalized a rule in which it
selected nine graphic images for use on new, larger cigarette warning
labels.397 In addition to the graphic images, each label would contain a
cessation hotline number, 1-800-QUIT-NOW.398
FDA WARNINGS, 2011399
Courts reviewing challenges to this regulation agreed that these
graphic warning labels would be emotionally powerful communicative
tools.400 Ironically, however, the images’ very power—their emotional
appeal, their visceral impact—spurred significant First Amendment
skepticism.
Characterizing the warning requirement as mandating factual dis-
closure, the Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the statute
mandating the creation of visual warnings against a facial First
396 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776, 1845 (2009).
397 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628
(June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
398 Id. at 36,674.
399 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Health Warnings for U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Proposed Regulation “Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements,”
REGULATIONS.GOV 26, 57 (Nov. 12, 2010), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?
documentId=FDA-2010-N-0568-0002&attachmentNumber=2&disposition=attachment&
contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/8JUT-LK98] (last visited July 9, 2016). Images available
at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1452.
400 See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 529 (6th
Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting) (agreeing that “colorful graphic images can evoke a visceral
response that subsumes rational decision-making”); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (images were “primarily intended to invoke an
emotional response”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272
(D.D.C. 2012) (same).
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Amendment challenge.401 But one judge dissented, describing the
graphic requirement as an unconstitutional “attempt to flagrantly
manipulate the emotions of consumers.”402 In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. FDA, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit used precisely that
logic to strike down the graphic warning label regulation on First
Amendment grounds, calling the graphic warnings “inflammatory”
and criticizing them as “primarily intended to invoke an emotional
response.”403 Based on its characterization of the images as “ideolog-
ical” rather than  “informational,”404 the court rejected the relaxed
Zauderer standard for evaluating commercial speech, under which the
graphic labels would pass constitutional muster if they presented
“purely factual and uncontroversial” information that was “reason-
ably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception to con-
sumers.”405 In lieu of Zauderer, the court in R.J. Reynolds applied the
more stringent Central Hudson test, under which the government had
to show that the graphic warning labels would directly advance a sub-
stantial government interest.406 Finding that the agency had “not pro-
vided a shred of evidence” that the regulations would advance the
agency’s goal of reducing smoking, especially among youth, the court
struck down the regulation.407 Because the agency opted not to peti-
tion the Supreme Court for review of the decision, R.J. Reynolds
ended—at least as of now—the FDA’s experiment with visual ciga-
rette warnings, despite the fact that the D.C. Circuit has since over-
ruled R.J. Reynolds’ rejection of the Zauderer standard in this
context.408 Even under Zauderer, however, courts may construe visual
401 See Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562 (reiterating that “graphic warnings can
convey factual information, just as textual warnings can,” and that both textual and graphic
warnings are “reasonably related” to the statutory purpose).
402 Id. at 529.
403 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216.
404 See id. at 1211–12 (describing regulation as a government attempt “to compel a
product’s manufacturer to convey the state’s subjective—and perhaps even ideological—
view”).
405 Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
406 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980).
407 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1219.
408 In Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA (AMI II), 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the D.C. Circuit
sitting en banc upheld a regulation mandating country-of-origin labels on meat. American
Meat Institute overruled R.J. Reynolds’ rejection of Zauderer in the context of product
labeling. Id. at 22.
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appeals as more than “purely factual and uncontroversial,” precisely
because of their high emotional impact.409
The practical takeaway from this debate is that if Congress and/or
agencies wish to use graphic warnings on a product label, the graphics
should be capable of characterization as predominantly factual rather
than predominantly emotional—as a form of notice or debiasing410
rather than a government-imposed nudge—in order to withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.411 Yet that distinction between information and
influence, between fact and emotion, bleeds together at the
margins.412
4. Anti-Lobbying and Anti-Propaganda Statutes
Agencies are entirely creatures of Congress—Congress creates
them, funds them, and empowers them. For nearly as long as agencies
have existed, Congress has been uncomfortable with agencies’ power
and with the potential for them to compete with Congress for the
attention and affection of the American public.413 Perhaps most
troubling, from Congress’s perspective, is when agencies use federal
funds—funds granted to them by Congress—to turn back and lobby
Congress.414 Thus, for over a century, Congress has passed statutes
that attempt to circumscribe agency communications.
409 Cf. id. at 27 (noting without deciding that “we can understand a claim that
‘slaughter,’ used on a [meat] product of any origin, might convey a certain innuendo” that
presumably could render it more than purely factual and uncontroversial).
410 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199, 216 (2006) (describing debiasing as, inter alia, a requirement “that firms identify the
potential negative consequences associated with their product”).
411 See Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 775 (2014)
(distinguishing between a nudge, in which a governmental organization purposefully
influences citizens’ behavior through regulatory incentives or disincentives, and notice,
which provides citizens with information in the hope that it will create better-informed
choices); see also id. at 793 (“If the warnings’ purpose was merely to provide truthful
information . . . in a salient format, then the warnings were simply a new form of notice,
and the First Amendment would not have stood in the way. . . .”).
412 See Goodman, supra note 395, at 545 (describing as “illusory” the “distinction
between the government’s informational goals to advance truth and its normative ones to
push a substantive agenda”).
413 See generally MORDECAI LEE, CONGRESS VS. THE BUREAUCRACY: MUZZLING
AGENCY PUBLIC RELATIONS (2011).
414 See THE LOBBYING MANUAL 338 (William V. Luneburg, Thomas M. Susman &
Rebecca H. Gordon eds., 4th ed. 2009) (“Congress does not want to fund anyone who tries
to influence its actions.”). Note that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an
independent agency funded through the Federal Reserve rather than through
congressional appropriations, may not be subject to these appropriations-linked
restrictions. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU PURSUANT TO SECTION 1017(E)(4) OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
12–13  (2015) (describing funding mechanism for CFPB).
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These statutes fall into two basic categories. The first category
includes anti-publicity and anti-propaganda laws aimed at limiting
agencies’ messaging to the American public. The second targets lob-
bying of Congress by agencies. The laws in this second category pri-
marily seek to restrict what is known as “grassroots lobbying,” which
occurs when agencies contact interest groups or members of the
public and encourage them to contact legislators to support or oppose
a congressional measure.415 Notably, the laws in both categories are
very broadly worded, so that on their faces they might cover a sizeable
swath of agency conduct; yet despite that strong language, they have
been largely ineffective. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO), Congress’s investigative wing, left with the task of inter-
preting these provisions,416 has chiseled away at the broad wording,
leaving very little agency conduct within their ambit.
We believe there are good reasons for GAO’s cautious and
narrow approach. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a principled
line between agencies’ informational and their political activities.
Moreover, even politically tinged agency communications serve a val-
uable purpose, by letting the public know what agencies are doing.
Nevertheless, congressional outrage over EPA’s use of visual media in
its recent clean water rulemaking appears to have breathed some new
life into these laws. This Section analyzes the possibility that this
renewed attention may create risks for visually adventurous agen-
cies—especially in an era of intense partisan conflicts between the leg-
islative branch and the executive branch.
a. Anti-Publicity Provisions
Perhaps the ultimate symbol of ineffective congressional hostility
to agency communications with the public is 5 U.S.C. § 3107, a statute
from 1913—still theoretically in effect today—that purports to bar
agencies from using appropriated funds to “pay a publicity expert.”417
Passed in reaction to a job posting by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Bureau of Roads seeking a “publicity expert,” the provi-
sion embodied congressional irritation with the perceived tendency of
415 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-188 (3d ed. 2004) (defining “direct lobbying” as opposed to
“grassroots” or “indirect” lobbying).
416 See Kevin R. Kosar, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42406,  CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY NEW
MEDIA USE 4 (2012) (noting that no agency is responsible for reviewing agency
communications, and that DOJ has never enforced these statutes); see also THE LOBBYING
MANUAL, supra note 414, at 340 (GAO has authority “to investigate all matters relating to
the use of appropriated funds”).
417 5 U.S.C. § 3107 (2015); LEE, supra note 413, at 89 (noting passage in 1913).
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agencies to market themselves to the public in order to gain both
public approval and political power.418 Even before it passed, the bill’s
sponsor recognized that the provision could not be applied to agen-
cies’ dissemination of factual or mission-related information.419
That loophole swallowed the law. Over the decades, GAO has
called the law “ineffective,”420 “vague,” and “difficult to apply.”421
Although it remains on the books, its main practical impact has been
the permanent elimination of the job title “publicity expert.”422
Congress has tried other approaches, with similarly lackluster
results. Beginning in 1951, it has routinely inserted into its annual
appropriations acts prohibitions on agency “publicity or propaganda.”
As a typical example, Section 718 of the Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations Act of 2015 provides: “No part
of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used
directly or indirectly . . . for publicity or propaganda purposes” unless
“authorized by Congress.”423
Like the “publicity expert” ban, anti-propaganda appropriations
bans use broad language that might in theory capture significant
agency activity, including many uses of visual “outflow” and “over-
flow” that we have described. Yet in practice, these bans have had a
narrow reach. GAO gives substantial deference to an agency’s justifi-
cation for spending appropriated funds on publicity,424 and it identi-
fies only three categories of activities that constitute prohibited
publicity or propaganda: 1) purely partisan materials; 2) agency self-
aggrandizement or puffery; and 3) covert propaganda.425 Each of
these has been narrowly defined or ignored. For example, GAO has
never found agency communications to constitute “purely partisan”
materials.426
418 LEE, supra note 413, at 85–86.
419 Id. at 87.
420 Id. at 91.
421 John E. Moss, B-181254, 1975 WL 9464 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 28, 1975) (letter from
deputy comptroller general).
422 LEE, supra note 413, at 90.
423 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 718, 128 Stat. 2332, 2383.
424 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-198 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that “the agency gets the benefit of any
legitimate doubt”).
425 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-303SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-26 (3d ed. supp. 2015).
426 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-199 (3d ed. 2004) (noting “the important proposition” that an
anti-propaganda provision “does not prohibit an agency’s legitimate informational
activities”).
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GAO has also declined to find “self-aggrandizement” provided
that an agency communication contains at least some legitimate
information-providing function.427 As recently as last December, for
example, GAO found that EPA had not committed self-
aggrandizement in the course of its extensive and highly visual
#CleanWaterRules campaign. GAO concluded that while the cam-
paign did emphasize the benefits of the proposed rule, “engendering
praise for the agency was not the goal.”428 Despite this recent finding,
some agency visuals do risk being characterized as self-aggrandize-
ment. For example, in August 2015, just as EPA was finalizing its
Clean Power Plan, it sent out a tweet of EPA Administrator Gina
McCarthy as Rosie the Riveter, a picture framed behind her featuring
a smiling President Obama flashing a thumbs-up sign:
427 See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-302504, Opinion Letter on
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003—Use of
Appropriated Funds for Flyer and Print and Television Advertisements 9 (Mar. 10, 2004)
(reasoning that materials produced by HHS to publicize new Medicare provisions were not
self-aggrandizement despite notable factual omissions, because they did not attribute
enactment of new benefits to HHS); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-303495,
Opinion Letter on Video News Release from the Office of National Drug Control Policy 2
(Jan. 4, 2005) (finding that the use of term “Drug Czar” to refer to the director of Office of
National Drug Control Policy was not self-aggrandizement).
428 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note 21.
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CURRENT MOOD . . . #CLEANPOWERPLAN, 2015429
This parody humorously lauds EPA’s hard work finalizing the
Clean Power Plan under McCarthy’s leadership. It also showcases
Obama’s approval of and influence over the plan. Other than the
patch of blue sky out the window, however, the image contains no
429 U.S. EPA (@EPA), TWITTER (Aug. 3, 2015), https://twitter.com/epa/status/
628247752284205056. Image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1437.
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factual information about the Plan itself. Rather, its emphasis is on the
success and diligence of the agency. Taken on its own, this tweet may
plausibly be characterized as self-aggrandizement, although it is likely
that the practical effect of such a ruling would be nil, because of the de
minimis cost of creating a single tweet.
In applying anti-propaganda provisions such as Section 718, only
the third category identified by the GAO—prohibiting “covert propa-
ganda”430—has provided any real limits thus far on agency publicity.
GAO has interpreted the “covert propaganda” prohibition essentially
as a disclosure requirement, explaining: “The critical element of
covert propaganda is the agency’s concealment from the target audi-
ence of its role in creating the material.”431 Occasionally agencies
have run afoul of this disclosure requirement, as noted above in
regard to video news releases during the George W. Bush
administration.432
Most recently, GAO found that EPA had distributed “covert
propaganda” during its #CleanWaterRules campaign.433 As part of
that campaign, EPA used Thunderclap—a social media platform
designed to create an “online flash mob” in favor of a particular con-
cept or organization.434 EPA created a Thunderclap page titled “I
Choose Clean Water” and used social media to sign up supporters:
430 See Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 718, 128 Stat. 2332, 2383 (barring use of appropriations for “propaganda”).
431 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note 21, at
12.
432 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (describing GAO investigation of
video news releases); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-304272, Letter to
Heads of Departments, Agencies, and Others Concerned Regarding Prepackaged News
Stories (Feb. 17, 2005) (GAO circular letter instructing agencies on how to avoid violating
prohibition on covert propaganda).
433 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note 21, at
12.
434 Frequently Asked Questions, THUNDERCLAP, https://www.thunderclap.it/faq [https://
perma.cc/4634-NMVP] (last visited July 10, 2016).
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EPA “I CHOOSE CLEAN WATER” FACEBOOK POST, 2014435
At 2 p.m. on September 29, 2014, the social media sites of every
registered supporter displayed the following message: “Clean water is
important to me. I support EPA’s efforts to protect it for my health,
my family, and my community.”436 The message also contained a
hyperlink connected to EPA’s web page on the Clean Water Rule.437
435 U.S. EPA, EPA—Water Is Worth It, FACEBOOK (Sept. 13, 2014), https://
www.facebook.com/EPAWaterIsWorthIt/posts/10152446114118337 [https://perma.cc/FFA2-
43BW]. Image available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/media/1443.
436 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note 21, at
4 n.10 (quoting from Thunderclap).
437 Id.
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According to Thunderclap, this “online flash mob” reached over 1.8
million people.438
GAO found that EPA’s Thunderclap campaign constituted
“covert propaganda” because, while original Thunderclap supporters
were aware that EPA was the campaign’s sponsor, the Thunderclap
message itself did not identify EPA; rather, it made the message
appear to have been written by the person on whose social media site
it appeared. As GAO stated, “EPA deliberately disassociates itself as
the writer, when the message was in fact written, and its posting solic-
ited, by EPA.”439 The agency, GAO found, had failed to identify its
authorship of the message to its target audience.440
In contrast to that finding of violation, GAO found no “covert
propaganda” in the agency’s extensive #DitchTheMyth campaign,
which was intended to counter messages sent by outside groups
attempting to derail the clean water rulemaking. As found by GAO,
“[t]he graphics used in the #DitchTheMyth campaign contained the
EPA logo, and the prewritten tweets contained the ‘#DitchTheMyth⏐
@EPAWater’ ascription at the end.”441 Affirming that the “covert
propaganda” bar is essentially a disclosure requirement, GAO found
this identification sufficient.
b. Anti-Lobbying Provisions
In addition to concerns over agency propagandizing, Congress
has long sought to prevent its own funds from being used against it in
the form of agency lobbying. Here too, congressional frustration dates
back almost a century.442 And here too, congressional efforts have
generally failed.
The Anti-Lobbying Act of 1919, which is still in effect, provides
that no federal funds may be used:
directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertise-
ment, . . . printed or written matter, or other device, intended or
designed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress, . . . to
favor, adopt, or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation, law,
ratification, policy, or appropriation, whether before or after the
438 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, I Choose Clean Water, THUNDERCLAP, https://
www.thunderclap .it/projects/16052-i-choose-clean-water [https://perma.cc/H7C6-7UUF]
(last visited July 11, 2016).
439 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note 21, at
13.
440 Id.
441 Id. at 15.
442 See THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 414, at 337 (describing Congress’s
historical rationale).
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introduction of any bill, measure, or resolution proposing such
legislation.443
In addition to this targeted statute, Congress has also used its
appropriation power. As a current and typical example, appropria-
tions bill Section 715 states that:
No part of any funds appropriated in this or any other Act shall be
used by an agency of the executive branch, other than for normal
and recognized executive-legislative relationships, for publicity or
propaganda purposes, and for the preparation, distribution or use of
any kit, pamphlet, booklet, publication, radio, television, or film
presentation designed to support or defeat legislation pending
before the Congress, except in presentation to the Congress
itself.444
Together these provisions represent congressional efforts to
restrict two forms of lobbying: “direct” lobbying, which involves direct
contact with legislators, and indirect or “grassroots” lobbying, in
which the lobbyist urges third-party intermediaries, such as citizens or
special interest groups, to contact their legislators about a pending leg-
islative measure.445 But as with the anti-publicity laws discussed
above, a lack of enforcement combined with narrowing interpreta-
tions by GAO have rendered these provisions more aspirational than
actual.446
For example, these laws have been found not to apply to
speeches, appearances, or writings by executive branch officials—and,
as a result, they do not apply to direct lobbying in any real sense.447
The Department of Justice never prosecuted anyone for violating the
Anti-Lobbying Act.448 In their current form, these somewhat overlap-
ping provisions primarily work to prevent certain grassroots lobbying
efforts by agencies.449 Although there is no monetary limit specified in
either law, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has suggested that in
order for a campaign to violate the Anti-Lobbying Act, it must be
443 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012).
444 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 715, 128 Stat. 2332, 2382–83.
445 See supra note 415 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between direct
and indirect or grassroots lobbying).
446 See LEE, supra note 413, at 196 (noting that narrow GAO decisions made Section
715 and its analogous statutory predecessors “largely . . . impotent in practical effect”).
447 See THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 414, at 339–40 (describing how both the
Department of Justice and the White House have interpreted the Act very narrowly).
448 See id. at 338 (noting that “although the Act has been on the books for almost 90
years, the Department of Justice has yet to initiate a single prosecution under it”).
449 See id. at 340 (describing how little substance remains of the Act so long as officials
refrain from “grossly obvious” grassroots efforts).
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“substantial,” by which OLC meant it must have cost over $50,000.450
Given the relatively low cost of social media dissemination, that mon-
etary requirement—if respected by GAO—could further limit the
provision’s reach. No such limit exists in the text, however, and GAO
has not interpreted anti-lobbying appropriations provisions to contain
such a limit.451
Limits on grassroots lobbying may take on new significance in the
era of social media. In its investigation of the clean water rulemaking
campaign, GAO found that EPA’s use of hyperlinks to outside organi-
zations violated Section 715’s prohibition on grassroots lobbying.452
Its analysis focused on a blog post, Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules, in
which an EPA communications director used a series of images to
show how clean water is “central to who I am as a person,”453
including photos of him with his children in the ocean and a snapshot
of his beloved microbrew beer.454 The post’s text contains embedded
hyperlinks to organizations that support his hobbies and that also sup-
port the Clean Water Rule. For example, the blog post says: “I am a
surfer. When I’m catching waves . . . I don’t want to get sick from
pollution.”455 A hyperlink takes interested viewers to a page on the
Surfrider Foundation’s website listing “[f]ive reasons why surfers are
more likely to get sick from polluted ocean water than beach
goers,”456 and which at one time had a link button that said, “Take
action . . . . Tell Congress to stop interfering with your right to clean
water!”457
450 See id. at 339 (describing OLC opinion defining “substantial” as an expenditure over
$50,000).
451 For example, in its recent decisions finding that EPA violated the FY 2014 and 2015
anti-lobbying appropriations provisions in its Thunderclap campaign and by embedding
hyperlinks to advocacy organizations lobbying on behalf of the Clean Water Rule, GAO
ordered the agency to “determine the cost associated with the prohibited conduct,”
without specifying that its finding of a violation was dependent on a minimum agency
expenditure. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note
21, at 2 (noting that while the agency specified that it spent over $64,000 on video and
graphic assets to raise awareness of its proposed rule, it seemed unlikely that the
hyperlinks and Thunderclap activity that led to the anti-lobbying violations would be
related to those costs).
452 Id. at 17–20.
453 Travis Loop, Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules, EPA BLOG: OUR PLANET, OUR HOME




456 Chad Nelsen, Surf Protection, Surf Economics, SURFRIDER FOUND. (July 30, 2010),
http://www.surfrider.org/coastal-blog/entry/five-reasons-why-surfers-are-more-likely-to-
get-sick-from-polluted-ocean-wa [https://perma.cc/WT45-PPU5].
457 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note
21, at 8 (describing link button, which has since been removed from Surfrider page).
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Similarly, another hyperlink accompanying the beer photo takes
viewers from the EPA blog post to the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) “Brewers for Clean Water” site. Although the site’s
content changed once the #CleanWaterRules campaign ended, during
the campaign the site asked breweries to take a pledge to “stand up
for clean water and to enforce the Clean Water Act.”458 The NRDC
page contained a prominent orange button leading to a form letter
addressed to members of Congress, stating: “I urge you to support the
Army Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency in
finalizing the proposed Clean Water Protection Rule as soon as pos-
sible. The proposed rule is based on overwhelming scientific evidence
that shows how water bodies are interconnected.”459
GAO found that these hyperlinks were a form of grassroots lob-
bying under Section 715. According to GAO, the provision is violated
when there is evidence of a “clear appeal by [an agency] to the public
to contact Members of Congress in support of or in opposition to
pending legislation.”460 GAO found that standard met because mem-
bers of Congress contacted through either Surfrider Foundation or
through the NRDC “could fairly perceive the contact as encourage-
ment to vote against pending legislation that would prevent imple-
mentation of” the Clean Water Rule.461 At the time of the blog’s
posting, there were several bills before Congress that sought to repeal
the rule.462 Notwithstanding EPA’s inability to control external web-
sites, GAO found that EPA had responsibility for its own message,
and that message included hyperlinks.463
In sum, while congressional prohibitions on agency publicity,
propaganda, and lobbying have thus far been rather anemic, GAO’s
recent report provides some indication that in a hostile political envi-
ronment, these provisions may be used against adventurous agencies.
But as the law now stands, agencies can take practical, relatively
simple steps to prevent a finding of violation. For example, agencies
that are using digital media to disseminate informational “outflow”
458 See id. at 10 (depicting screenshot of the since updated page).
459 Don’t Let Polluters Poison Our Water, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, https://secure.nrdc
online.org/site/Advocacy?cmd=display&page=UserAction&id=3591 (last visited Aug. 17,
2016).
460 Id. at 17.
461 Id. at 19.
462 See, e.g., Regulatory Integrity Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 1732, 114th Cong. (2015)
(bill seeking to withdraw the proposed rule); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note 21, at 18 (listing proposed anti-WOTUS
legislation).
463 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO B-326944, Opinion Letter, supra note 21, at
23–24 (“EPA’s choice of hyperlinks formed its own expressive act for which the agency is
responsible.”).
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should be cautious in their use of hyperlinks. Agencies should also
ensure that their messages about rulemaking are not so agency-
focused that they approach self-aggrandizement.
Most importantly, agencies’ use of visual tools for “overflow”
purposes—that is, to advocate for broad issues beyond their
rulemaking power, such as DOL’s Batgirl video on equal pay—has
the potential to veer into the territory of grassroots lobbying. Notably,
in the examples we discuss, the relevant agencies appear to have been
very careful to: 1) identify themselves, so as to avoid a designation of
“covert propaganda”; and 2) refrain from overtly exhorting viewers to
contact their legislators. Yet the clear import of their messages is just
that, and it seems possible that GAO, or Congress, might zero in on
this emerging category of political messaging.
On balance, however, the rise of visual media is likely to render
anti-publicity and anti-lobbying laws weaker rather than stronger.
There is an ever-increasing quantity of agency communications—far
too much for GAO or Congress to effectively monitor.464 Moreover,
because digital media is both instantaneous and inexpensive, post-hoc
findings of violation may have only a limited effect. For example, by
the time GAO issued its decision, EPA’s Thunderclap message was
#cleanwater under the bridge.
As the highly politicized GAO investigation of the
#CleanWaterRules campaign amply demonstrates, these laws’ main
impact lies more in the political sphere, and in their potential chilling
effect on agencies. Particularly when Congress and the President are
from different political parties, anti-lobbying and anti-propaganda
provisions offer a convenient tool for Congress to seek to control, or
push back against, the agenda of agencies and the President. Notably,
both sides may have something to gain from such a political battle.
EPA, for instance, has not taken down external hyperlinks, although
there is now a tiny “exit” symbol next to the hyperlinks indicating to
viewers that they are connected to a non-government website.465 In
fact, it has used GAO’s finding to garner renewed support for its mis-
sion. In a blog post entitled We Won’t Back Down from Our Mission,
an EPA official stated: “It’s almost 2016. One of the most effective
ways to share information is via the Internet and social media. Though
464 See Kosar, supra note 416, at 8 (“More communications may provide for more
opportunities for an agency to transgress (inadvertently or otherwise) the statutory
prohibitions against unauthorized publicity and propaganda and lobbying with
appropriated funds.”).
465 See, e.g., Jim Jones, Endorsing a Path to Healthier Schools, EPA BLOG: EPA
CONNECT (July 8, 2016), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2016/07/endorsing-a-path-to-healthier-
schools/ (showing “exit” symbols next to external links to other organizations).
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backward-thinkers might prefer it, we won’t operate as if we live in
the Stone Age.”466 It then continued: “We want to be as transparent
as possible. We want to engage diverse constituents in our work. And
we want them to be informed.”467 We think EPA is right.
CONCLUSION
Visual rulemaking is a new and dynamic phenomenon, so it is not
possible to predict with certainty how it will unfold over time. At this
early stage, however, we are optimistic that visual rulemaking will
advance important interests. Visuals can make the President’s involve-
ment in the regulatory state more transparent, shedding technicolor
light on what has always been true but often hidden from plain sight:
There is no hermetic seal between the technocratic and the political,
between science and values, between fact and spin. Visual rulemaking
also provides agencies with a powerful, more dialogic means of
responding to narratives that unfold during rulemaking proceedings.
Even more importantly, visual rulemaking promises to raise public
awareness of rulemakings and to empower participation by more
diverse stakeholders, not merely those who are well-equipped to navi-
gate dense, textual NPRMs. In light of these benefits, we believe that
administrative law doctrine and theory should welcome, rather than
simply ignore, this growing and influential phenomenon.
466 Liz Purchia, We Won’t Back Down from Our Mission, EPA BLOG: EPA CONNECT
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2015/12/we-wont-back-down-from-our-mission/
[https://perma.cc/8HG5-J6FY].
467 Id.
